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Abstract
The purpose of this paper is two-fold. First, I attempt a taxonomy of the extant accounting literature on
disclosure: that is, a categorization of the various models of disclosure in the literature into wellintegrated topics. With regard to the taxonomy, I suggest three broad categories of disclosure research in
accounting. The first category, which I dub “association-based disclosure”, is work that studies the effect
of exogenous disclosure on the cumulative change or disruption in investors’ individual actions, primarily
through the behavior of asset equilibrium prices and trading volume. The second category, which I dub
“discretionary-based disclosure”, is work that examines how managers and/or firms exercise discretion
with regard to the disclosure of information about which they may have knowledge. The third category,
which I dub “efficiency-based disclosure”, is work that discusses which disclosure arrangements are
preferred in the absence of prior knowledge of the information, that is, preferred unconditionally. Then, in
the final section of the paper, I recommend information asymmetry reduction as one potential starting
point for a comprehensive theory of disclosure. That is, I recommend information asymmetry reduction
as a vehicle to integrate the efficiency of disclosure choice, the incentives to disclose, and the
endogeneity of the capital market process as it involves the interactions among individual and diverse
investors.
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Abstract
In this paper I attempt a t axonomy of the ext ant accounting literature
on disclosure and suggest as categories : "a ssociation-based disclosure,"
work that studies the effects of disclosure on asset equilibrium prices
and trading volume; "discretio nary-based disclosure," work that examines m a nagers' discretion in the disclosure of informatio n about which
* Many people have been kind enough to rea d v arious drafts of this document a nd offer me nume rous
comments and suggestions . They include: John Cor e, Gus De Fra n co, R on D ye, Pau l Fischer , Rick
Johnston, Oliver Kim, Rick Lambert , Christian Leuz, Margaret McKinley, Adam R eed , Ricardo
Reis, Jonat han R ogers , Phillip S t ocken, Andy Van Buskirk , Ross Watts, Lei Zh ou, a nd seminar
participa nts at Washington Univer sity. Let me hasten t o add, h owever, tha t I am solely r esponsible
for any opinions, errors, or omissions associated with this doc ument. Finally, I would like t o express
m y s incere a ppreciation to the editors of the Journal of Accounting a nd E con omics for p roviding
me with an opportunity to write a s urvey of the disclosure literature, a nd to the Wharton School of
the U niversity of Pennsylvania for its continued support and financial assista nce in a ll my research
endeavors .

they may have knowledge; and "efficiency -based disclosure," work that
discusses which disclosure arrangements are preferred in the absence of
prior knowledge of t he information. In addition, in t he final section of the
paper, I discuss information asymmetry reduction as a starting point for
a comprehensive theory of disclosure.
JEL classification: G14
Keywords : Disclosure, information asymmetry reduction, cost of capital
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1

Introduction

This document results from an assignment from the editors of the Journal of Ac-

counting and Economics ( JAE) to survey the ext ant literature on disclosure and
write a paper that co uld be titled appropriately 'Models of the R ole of Disclosure
in Capital Markets."

The motivation for this assignment, I presume, is that over

the past two decades disclosure research in accounting has burgeoned from a handful of papers on the topic to a substantial, and well-recognized , body of work. In
addition, the JAE has been at the forefront of promoting economics-based research
in accounting, and many papers commonly cited in the disclosure literature can be
traced back to it. Finally, w hile some might debate w here disclosure falls as a topic
in the pantheon of all economics-based research, arguably, its role in accounting is
central. Economics-based models of disclosure establish a link between financial reporting and the economic consequences of that activ ity. W ithout such a link, research
in financial account ing is open t o the charge that it studies bookkeeping rules and
opinion promulgations , but in t he absence of any economic motivation.
All this having been said, executing a task of this nature is less straig htforward
than it appears. Using the a ssigned title as a resource, one might suggest surveying
comprehensively models that were employed to discuss disclo sure in the context of

capital markets, which, in addition, seem t o have gained some prominence in the
accounting literature (this, after a ll, being an assignment from an accounting j ournal). There are two considerations, however, that militate against a comprehensive
survey: one practical, the other personal. The practical issue is that t here is no comprehensive, or unifying, theory of disclosure, or at least none that I felt comfortable
identifying as such.

In the disclosure literat ure, t here is no centra l paradigm, no
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single compelling notion that gives rise to all subsequent research, no well-integrated
''theory," how ever one interprets that term. Indeed, in its current composition the
disclosure literature could probably best be characterized as an eclectic commingling
of highly idiosyncratic (and highly stylized), economics-based models , each of which
attempts to examine some small piece of the overall disclosure puzzle. Eclecticism is
exacerbated by t he fact that disclosure, as a t opic, spans three literatures, accounting,
finance, and economics, and thus inevitably takes on features of those literatures .
Acknowledging that a comprehensive theory of disclosure is a worthw hile goal, the
objective of this pa per is more modest. A s a small, preliminary step toward a comprehensive theory, in this document first I consider the full panoply of t heory-ba sed,
disclosure-related research in accounting and attempt a taxonomy of the literature:
that is, a categorization of the various disclosure models into well-integrated topics. Then, in the final section of the paper, I recommend one starting point for a
comprehensive theory.
With regard to the taxonomy, I suggest t hree broad categories of disclosure research in accounting. The first category of research is work w hose primary concern is
how exogenous disclosure is associated with, or related to, the change or disruption
in the activities of investors w ho compete in ca pit al m a rket sett ings as individua l,
welfare-maximizing agents. I dub this research "association-based disclosure." T he
distinguishing feature of work in this category is that it studies the effects of exogenous disclosure on the aggregate or cumulative change in investors' actions, primarily
through the behavior of asset equilibrium prices and trading volume. T he second category is work that examines how managers and/or firms exercise discretion with regard
t o the disclosure of information about which they may have knowledge. I dub this
research "discretionary-based disclosure." The distinguishing feature of work in this
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category is that it treats disclosure as end ogenous by considering managers' and/or
firms' incentives to disclose information know n to them ; typically this is done in the
context of a capital market sett ing in which the mar ket is characterized as (simply) a
single, representative consumer of disclosed information. The t hird category is work
that discusses w hich disclosure arrangements are preferred in the absence of prior
know ledge of the information, that is , ex ante. I dub this research "efficiency -based
disclosure." The distingu ishing feature of work in this category is that it examines unconditional disclosure choices; typically this is done in the context of a capital market
setting in which the actions of individual, welfare-maximizing agents are endogenous .
As w ith any taxono my, t here is an element of discretion in the categorization of some
papers; I make no claim that my choice is definit ive.
In this paper, I devote an essay to each category of research in my t axonom y.
That is, the first essay concerns association-based disclosure resea rch, the second ex amines discret ionary-based d isclosure research, a nd the third reviews efficiency -based
disclosure research. This sequencing of topics has advantages and d isadvantages. The
main advantage is pedagogy. For example , association-based disclosure is discussed
first becaus e it is perhaps the most straightforward t opic: it studies relations between
disclosure and capital market phenomena under the assumptio n t hat the incentives
and/ or efficiency of disclosure arrangements are fix ed or exogenous. D iscretionarybased disclosure then introduces the incent ives for disclosure activity (but typically in
the a bsen ce of ex ante considerations). Finally, efficiency-based disclosure ex amines
unconditional disclosure choice. The main disadvantage of discussing associat ionbased disclosure first is t hat it requires t hat I discuss how dis closure affects capital
market phenomena without first offering a ratio nale for why disclosure exists in the
first place (e.g. , efficiency-based disclosure) . Suffice it to say t hat each of the three
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essays is a self-contained dis cussion a nd there is no harm in reading t he essays out of
my suggested order.
In each essay I at tempt to document the historical evolut ion of the topic, examine
the role of maintained assumptions, and briefly r ev iew the overall stren gths and
weaknesses of individual contributions . In addition , in each survey I att empt to
illustrate t he analysis underlying indiv idual models t hroug h a device that I r efer
t o a s a "modeling vignette." As a pedagogical device, m odeling vignettes have t hree
goals . First, t hey represent a n at tempt at d ist illing a complex analysis into its central
feature, while a t the same time b eing sufficiently robust to sust ain t hat feature .
Second, they represent a n attempt a t offering a series of fully integ rated examples
in which a reader can t race t he evolution of a t opic with the minimal amount of
modeling d islocatio n. (If the ultimat e goal is a comprehensive theory of disclosure,
then p erh aps the penultimate goal is a series of fully integrated modeling v ignettes.)
Fina lly, I am of t he conviction that one cannot appreciat e fully a paper's contribut io n
w ithout "getting one's ha nds dirty," which is to say actually working through simple
examples as an exercise. Consequently, my intent in offering these vignet tes is to
suggest a series of exercises that an interested reader can work through, in the same
fashion that t extb ooks offer problems at the en d of each chapter.
It should go without saying, but I will state it anyway, that a truly comprehensive
theory of d isclosure would integrate simulta neously into its an alysis all three elements
of my taxonom y. That is, a comprehensive theory would recognize appropriately the
roles of efficiency, incentives, and t he endogeneity of the market process as it involves
the interactions among individual, an d diverse, welfare-m aximizing investor agents.
But t his is a cha llenge for future research, and m y goal here is limited to layi ng out
w hat I regard as t he building b locks of a comprehensive t heory (in sections 2-4) and
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recommending one starting point for a comprehensive theory (in section 5) .
The personal issue that militates against a comprehensive survey is t hat I h ave
some reservat ions about this t y pe of assignment . At best, a survey is a p oor substitute for reading the original source documents ; at worst, it is a bland and uninspired
regurgit ation of the lit erature. To a ssist a reader interested in co mprehensively surveying t he lit erature, throughout this document I sprinkle footnote references to a
large (but I make no claim exhaustive) list of d isclosure-related research in the literatures of accounting, finance, and economics .1 In lieu of a comprehensive survey, I offer
a personal a ccount, or memoire, of work in w hich I have participated and continue
t o have a keen interest . I make no apology for this. I believe that a reader profits
most from the personal reflections and commentary of someone who has pa rticipated
in the evolut ion of a research pa radigm. I leave it to others t o write about research
in which t hey are keenly interested.
With regard t o the last point, one final caveat is a pp ropriate. The JAE editors
have a ssigned others the task of surveying two topics that deal w ith issues that
are germane to m y discussion: contract theory in a ccounting and disclosure in the
empirical accounting literature. 2 In this document every attempt is made to eschew
these topics so as to minimize the overlap among surveys.
A brief summary of this paper is as follows. Essays on association-based, discretionarybased, and efficiency-based d isclosure are offered in sections 2, 3, and 4, respectively.
In the final section of the paper, section 5, I summarize m y observations and briefly
discuss suggestio ns for future research.
l There exists a veritable cornucopia of research on this t opic; thus, as a triage in p reparing the
referen ces I did not include working pa p er s (including my own) .
2 For the for mer, see Lambert [2000]; for t he la tter, see Healy a nd P alepu [2000] and Core [2000].
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Association-Based Disclosure

How is disclosure associated with, or related to, the change or disruption in the activities of investors who are div erse and compet e in capital market settings t o maximize
their indiv idual welfares? Association-based d isclosure research attempts to examine
this problem by characterizing the effects of disclosure on t he cumulative actions of
individual , investor agent s at the time of a disclosure event . T wo characterizations of
aggregate or cumulative behavior that are of particular interest in association-based
studies concern the relations between disclosure and price changes, and disclosure and
trading volume. In offering characterizations of this nature, association-based studies attempt to extend the literature on economics-based representations of financial
markets with diverse investor agents that go back at least as far as Lint ner.3
The m otivation for this essay is two-fold. F irst, I offer a straightforward historical
account of the evolution of t he association-based lit erature. Second, to the extent to
which a comprehensive theory is required to incorporate the effects of d isclosure on
the behavior of individ ual, welfare-maximizing agents who interact in capital market
settings, I discuss general is sues related to this t opic . The hist orical account itself
is done through a series of modeling vignettes. The role of the vignettes is to show
how the literature developed, w ith increasingly more sophisticated m odels subsuming
earlier, simpler models as deficiencies in prior work were identified. In addit ion,
the modeling-vignette presentation format allows me to comment o n the variety of
maintained assumptions employed in this literature, and to point the interested reader
in the direction of work that discusses the role of these assumpt ions in greater depth.
3 Specifically, Lintner [1968). See also Karpoff [1987), who surveys the literature on t he relation
between price changes and trading volume in capital markets through 1987, and p oints to the
deficiency of most of the theory-based literature to explain price-volume relations up to that point
in time (i.e., 1987).
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A brief summary of t he vignettes is as follow s. Model

# 1 introduces a very st yl-

ized representation of disclosure and price cha nge; its primar y p urpose is to motivat e
subsequent d iscussion. M odel #2 introduces d isclosure in a Walrasian setting . Models # 3-6 ext end that discussio n t o settings in w hich market agent s condition their
expectations over market clearing prices (i.e., so-called "rational expectations" models of trade) : first in one-period settin gs and then in two-period settings. In m od el #7
disclosure is examined in conj unction w ith heuristic b ehavior and perfectly com p etitive m arkets. In m odels #8 and # 9, disclosure is considered in the context of m od els
of imperfect competit ion; first with market agents who are exclusively Bayesian and
then with agents w ho are B ayesian and heuristic. Fina lly, in model # 10, disclosure is d iscussed in a sett ing in which market expectations are conditioned over b oth
contemporaneous d emand a nd t rading volume infor m ation.

A Simple Model of Disclosure Association (model #1). 4 To illustrate the
evolution of research o n d isclosure associat ion and other ideas, I begin by suggesting
a very st ylized model of disclosure. T o start, I assume that there exists some asset
(e.g., a firm) wh ose value is uncertain, and about which some information is disclosed.
U ncertainty can b e represented by a random variable of a ny variety, but the normal
distribution is well b ehaved m athematically a nd u nderstood at an intuitiv e level by
most researchers. Consequently, I assume that uncertain firm value is represent ed
by a va riable

u,

which has a normal distributio n w ith m ean m a nd precisio n (i.e .,

the reciprocal of varia nce) h. T he precision h can be interpreted as t he market's
p revailing level of commo n knowledge about t he firm' s u ncert a in valu e,

u. Simila rly,

I assume t hat the d isclosure is informat ion about firm value, but information that is
less t han perfect . For example, let disclosure be represent ed by fj =
4

u + fj, w here fj is

In conjunction with model # 1, see Holthausen a nd Verrecch ia [1988] and Subra m a nyam [1996].
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also a normal distribut ion w ith m ean 0 and p recisio n n . I int erpret, and refer t o, n as
the precision of t h e information cont ent of the d isclosure, fj . Fina lly, I assume t h at
all relevant issues related t o dis closure can be cha racterized by assumin g an economy
w ith t wo p eriods : time T - 1 is the p eriod immediately before disclosure occurs, and
time Tis t he time immediately a fter (i.e., the disclosure p eriod ). Let t he prices for
the a ssets at t im es T - 1 an d T b e represented by Pr -1 a nd Pr, respectively.
Before pro ceeding, let me comment on the role of a number of ma int ained assumptions. F irst, as alluded t o in t he introductio n, dis closur e, i.e., fj

=

ii

+ ij ,

is

an exogenous feature of t he economy I describe . By v irtue of this, no where have I
est ablished a rat ionale, o r demand, for the disclosure in the first place. Presumably,
however, a n interested reader can look t o the t wo subsequent essays for guidance as
to why disclosure may be either supplied or demanded in t he context of the economy I describe. For reasons of pure ped agogy, it is convenient t o start out w ith
the assumption t hat d isclosure simply "exists," and deal with the ra tionale for that
disclosure later. Second, I describe an economy t hat is comprised of only a single
ris ky asset (and, starting w ith model # 2, a risk-free numeraire co mmodit y ). Unlike
the assumption of exogenous d isclosu re, this assumpt ion is maintained throughout
m y essays . Where the r ole of multiple risky a ssets has b een considered in settings
similar to the ones that I a m about to discuss , one typically finds that claims or
results tha t a rise in a single-asset economy can b e reversed. 5 R eversal may occur
in mult iple-asset economies beca use of int eractions among assets. Consequently, a
mainta ined assumption here is t hat o ne can control for m ult iple-asset effects . Fina lly,
my analysis is ceteris paribus: t hat is , m y analysis is premised on t he notio n t hat a ll
elements other than t he ones I study are fixed, or const ant . For example, consider a
5

See, for example, Adma ti [1985] and Holt hausen and Verrecchia [1988].
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multiple-asset economy in w hich firms in one industry manufacture a pples and firms
in anot her manufacture o ranges. In addit ion, suppose t hat disclosu re has different
effects on the valuation of, and/or t he production or coordination-related activ ities
w ithin, the apple manufacturing industry versus the orange m a nufacturing indust ry.
Then a comparison of the effects of disclosure on apple versus orange ma nufacturing firms is flawed because other features of the comparison are not fixed. A s with
multiple-asset effects, I abstract from this problem.
Cont inuing with the discussion of association-based resea rch, as manifestat ions of
the disruption in the cumulative actions of investors, there are a variety of phenomena
one could study. A very inco mplete list mig ht include: the functional r elation between
disclosure and price change; the functional relat ion between d isclosure and t rading
volume; the extent t o which disclosure changes the collective uncertainty about the
asset's value at the time of the disclosure event; the extent to w hich disclosure makes
markets more liquid; etc. Many of these phenomena are d iscussed in the original
source documents.

To provide some appreciation for an analysis of that type, I

start with t wo. First, I consider the functional relationship between a n exogenous
disclosure, fj, an d the change in an asset's price at timeT, Pr-PT-1· Second, I assess
the percentage of t he variabilit y in price change at time T explained exclusively by
the disclosure (controlling for certain key factors) . To illustrate these vehicles for
studying the effects of disclosure, suppose for a moment tha t the change in price at
time T has the following functional form

w here a , {3 , and 1 are (fixed) parameters,

f2

represents variables other than fj that

are relat ed t o firm value a nd t he change in price, and 1;. represents variables unrelated
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to firm value (e.g., noise) . Here, one could interpret the coefficient on f),

/3, as

that

element of the functional relation in the change in price that results directly from
disclosure, as opposed to other factors. When in the discussion below the change in
price assumes a linear functional form like the one above, for convenience I refer to

/3 as the disclosure response coefficient

(DRC) in the change in price.

A DRC tells us something about how the change in price relies on, or is governed
by, disclosure, as dist inct from other factors . For example, intuition suggests that
as the models become increasingly more complicat ed, the DRC w ill decline because
ot her factors , such as the ex istence of private information as a subst itute for public
disclosure, will reduce the reliance of prices on dis closure. But to confirm this intuition, and perhaps also to highlight where it fails, I consider also the percentage
of the va riability in price change expla ined exclusively by disclosure . In computing
this percentage, I control for cert ain key factors . Which factors one cont rols for is
somewhat arb itrary, b ut here I suggest controlling for the pr ice at timeT- 1, Pr-1,
and noise,

~.

The reason for co ntrolling for the price a t time T - 1 is that I want to

eliminate from the variabilit y of price change that part of the variability that arises
from activities prior to the disclosure, as captured by Pr-1· In addition, I want to
control for noise because its contribution t o the variance in price change is not economically relevant. Let

.6.% represent the percent age of the varia bility of price change

expla ined exclusively by disclosure a t time T. When one controls for both price at
time T - 1 and noise, the percentage of the variability explained by the disclosure at
time T is defined by

.6.% = 1 _ VAR [Pr-_:: Pr-~ liJ = y,Pr -1 = Pr=h~ = ~l .
V AR [Pr- Pr-1 IPr-1 = Pr-1, ~ = ~]

When in the discussion below I discuss the percentage of variability explained by
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disclosure, for convenience I refer to it t he ".6. %-sta tistic."
Now I return t o developing a v ery stylized model of price change and disclosure.
In this model I ass ume that a ll investor agents who participate in the market are
risk-neutral, can assume unlimited liability for realizations of firm value, and h ave
no information (private or public) about firm value at tim e T- 1. Because of the
absence of information, at time T- 1 all expectations are based on the unconditional
expectation of ii, w hich is m . Furthermore, b eca use invest or agents a re risk-neutral,
the price of the asset at t imeT- 1 is Pr-1

=

m . At timeT d isclosure occurs (i.e.,

fj = y is disclosed); I assume that it is eit her the only informat ion about firm value, or,

if there is other information about firm value revealed at the same time (e.g ., privat e
information ), it is subsumed in fj = y . T hat is, with regard t o valuing the firm, fj is a
sufficient statistic for fj and a ll other information. If fj = y is a sufficient statistic for a ll
information and investors are risk-neutral, then Pr = E [iiliJ = y] = m +

h :n

(y - m ) .

This implies

Pr- Pr-1 = h

n

-

+ n (y- m ) ,

where t he expression fj - m can be interpreted as t he "disclosure surprise" in tha t it
represents the ext ent to which fj

=

y deviates from it s expected value of m, which

is also the exp ected value of ii. Here, the DRC is

hn ;
+n

it can be describ ed as the

precision of t he disclosure, n, relative to the t otal precision of firm value conditiona l
on t he disclosure, h

+ n.

In ot her words, t he DRC is t he information content of the

disclosure relative to a ll t hat is known a bout firm value subsequent to the d isclosure .
Finally, note t ha t in t his simple model all the variability in price ch ange is explained
by disclosure at timeT. For example, V AR [Pr- Pr -1 IY = y] = 0. Consequently, this
model's .6.%-stat ist ic is 1.
B efore proceeding, let me briefly m ention t he role of two more assumptions t hat I
11

maintain throughout these essays. Unlimited liability ensures that price change characterizations remain facile and transparent . This virtue not withstanding, in m odels
of the type that I discuss below researchers have long recognized that unlimited liability is a n artifact and therefore have studied its role. 6 For example, unlimited
liability is proba bly a p oor assumption if one intends to study t he role of equity in
conjunction w ith debt a s vehicles for financing a firm' s activities. As for the assumption tha t fj = y is a sufficient statistic, a conventional interpretation of sufficiency is
that any information in existence prior to period Tis a forecast of fj , w hich the actual
disclosure of fj in period T subsumes. 7
Continuing with the discussion, in the evolution of analyses that purport to associate disclosure with price change, the characterization offered so far is transparent
and facile. 8 Nonetheless, the model's elegance is achieved at the expense of an extreme stylization of how markets function. In this model, for example, there is no
informatio n about firm value that has any relevance other than the information t hat
arises directly from disclosure. Perhaps more significant, the model describes a world
in which no trade occurs. The reason for this is that beliefs are homogeneous in both
periods T - 1 and T, and hence there is no rationale for t rade based on information.
So, if a minimum condition for "model robustness" is that some trading volume arises
at the time of disclosure, more work remains.
To a chieve trading volume, it is likely that we will need to appeal to som e elements
of investor-agent diversity, because trade evolves primarily from differences across
See, for example, Fischer and Verrecchia 11997].
See, for example, Abarbanell, et al. [1995 .
Some might even argue that it captures well the spirit, if perhaps not the detail, of a n empirical
investigation of the relation between disclosure and price change. Note, however, that t his characterization implies that price changes are normally distributed, whereas empirical studies typically
assume that returns are normally distributed. While this dislocation b etween theory and empirical
work is fairly innocuous, it points to the fact that some caution should be exercised in interpreting
too litera lly any statements that I make in the contex t of empirical-based research.
6
7
8
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investors: for example, differences of opinion, differences in endow ments, differences
in how investors use information, etc. Consequently, let me first put forth a list of
attributes of investor-agent rationality and diversity that it would seem important
for a model to incorporate, or at least address, in any theory-based characterization
of the interactions of individual, welfare-maximizing a gents who compete in capital
market settings. Having done that, in the subsequent discussion I successively fold
into the model each attribute, a s a way of understanding how the attribute affects
assumptions and conclusions of prior work. The list is as follows.

1. Investors are diversely informed.
2. Invest ors make rational inferences from market prices.
3. Investors rationally anticipate disclosure.
4 . Investors, in addition to being diversely informed, a lso have information of
diverse or heterogeneous quality.
5 . Invest ors interpret disclosure in d iverse ways.
6. Invest ors incorporate disclosure into their beliefs in diverse ways: that is , some
agents depart from (narrowly) Bayesian behavior in how they incorporate disclosure
into their posterior expectations.
7. Invest ors condition their beliefs over diverse economic stimuli: sp ecifically, they
make rational inferences from both market prices and trading volume.

Diversely informed investors (model #2). 9 I start with the following expanded story of a market w ith trade. There are a large number of investor agents,
say, N, who exchange shares in the asset w hose value is uncertain by comparing it s
value relative t o a numeraire commo dit y, whose value is fixed at 1 (e.g., a government bond). E ach investor i holds an amount
9

In conjunction with model #2, see Lintner [1968] .
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xi

of the uncertain-valued asset, and an

amount bi of the certain-valued asset . For convenience, let x represent t he per-capita
supply of the uncertain-valued asset, w here

x is defined by x =

~i (xi/N ).

As this

analysis evolves, it will b e useful to allow for t he fact that t he per-capita supply of the
uncertain-valued asset,

x, is also a normally distributed ra ndom variable with mean 0

and precision t. When, below, I examine t he variability of price changes arising from
disclosure, m y intentio ns are t o int erpret

x as noise a nd t as the precision of the noise.

Finally, while there are two asset -types in this economy, for all int ents a nd purposes
only the uncerta in-valued asset w ill concern u s. C onsequently, for convenience and
w herever it creat es no confusion, henceforth I will refer to the u ncertain-valued asset
as simply "the asset ."
Before proceeding, n ot e that another a ssumpt ion mainta ined t hroughout this
analysis is that the first mo ment (i.e ., mean) of a ll other random variables is zero
(with t he exception of the mean of uncertain firm value, ii ). In particular, t he error
term around the disclosure of firm value,

~'

h as a mean of 0. If we treat disclosure

as exogenous, w hich is a feature of the associat ion-based d isclosure literature, the
assumption that all means are zero would appear t o b e w ithout loss of generality.
W h en disclosure is t reated as endogenous, however, one w ould need to recognize that
disclosure prepa rers a nd disseminators may not have incentives that a re perfectly
aligned wit h the goal of providing unbiased assessments of firm value. T he existence
of disclosure, or reporting, bias is an important issue in financial rep orting, wh ere
often data are produced and d isseminated in conjunctio n with achieving some objective .10 Nonetheless, I abstract from t his issue here in a n attempt to facilit ate the
discussion.
lOOn specifically the topic of reporting bias , see F ischer a nd Verrecchia [2000]. M ore generally, t his
issue touches on concerns related to the truthfulness or credibility of the disclosure. This is a t opic
reserv ed for the second essay.

14

As in our previous model, I assume that at time T - 1 there is no information
about the ass et (i.e., t he uncertain-valued asset). Consequently, as in our previous
model Pr-1 = m.

Befo re trade takes place at time T, however, each investor i

u, w here this information is

obtains different private information about the value of
represented by zi = u

+ Ei

and Ei also has a normal distribution w ith mean 0 and

precision s, say. The parameter Ei is also a "noise" term. As such, it captures the
extent to which each investor's information about t he uncertain value of the asset is
accurate. For example, a high s denotes very accurate private information , and a low

s denotes very inaccurate information. For convenience, henceforth I assume that the
covariance across any pair of error terms is zero : for example, E [f/£i ] = E [Ei Ej] = 0.
This implies that

u, y,

and zi have a trivariate no rmal distribution w ith means of

(m, m, m) and a covariance matrix given by

h-1
h-1

h-1

+ n-1

h-1

h-1
h-1

+ s-1

Consequently, w hen investors condition their expectations over the public disclosure
and their private information, their expectations are

E [u-Iy, z,·] -_ hm + ny + szi ,
h+n + s
and the precision of their ex pectations, (VAR [uly, zi]) -

1

,

is

Finally, I assume that the E'/ s have finite variance; because of this, limN -;oo ~

L:i E:i

~

0 for any realizations of c/s by the law of large numbers. Note that this implies for
any realizations of t he z/s, limN-;oo ~

L:i zi
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~ u.

Note that another maintained assumption is that errors are uncorrelated.

As

with the introduction of multiple risky assets, correlated errors may reverse claims
and results found in uncorrelat ed error set tings. 11 Nonetheless , I abstract from this
l SSUe.

If the motivation for extending our model is to ensure trading volume, then it is

useful to relax our ass umption that all investors are risk-neutral. When all investors
are risk-neutral and have different private informat ion, trading volume can arise. It
will be, however, of a very st ylized nature. In effect, t hat investor w ith the highest
conditional expectation for the value of the asset at timeT (i.e. , the investor w ith the
highest E [u iy, zi]) will acquire at a minimum the total supply of the asset . Indeed,
the extent to which the investor with the highest conditional expectation will go long
in the asset is only limited by the ability and/ or cost of other traders to sell the asset
short.
To ensure that trade is less stylized , I assume that investor agents are risk averse,
with a utility for an amount of a consumable good g given by U(g) = - exp [- ;J,
where r measures an investor's tolerance for risk. This utility function is the (negative) exponential, and has reasonably desirable properties for a utility function: it is
increasing and con cave in g, implying that an investor prefers more of a consumable
good to less, but t o a decreasing degree. The true appeal of the negative exponential,
however, is that when it is used in conjunction with the normal distribution, it results
in a facile analysis. Finally, note that homogeneous risk tolerances across risk-averse
invest or agents is a maintained assumption throughout the analysis . T his is a very
innocuous assumption, however, in that it is a straightforward exercise to generalize
all the models that I discuss below to allow for heterogeneous risk t olerances (which
11See, for example, Lundholm [1988].
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is commonly done in the original source documents).
Our next step is to determine the Pr. To do this, I appeal to the notion that
the large number of investors inhabiting our market ensures that Pr evolves from
perfect competition. To dwell on the notion of perfect competition briefly, note that
perfect competition assumes that each investor agent in the market behaves as if his
or her actions or behaviors have no effect on price, a nd in equilibrium this conjecture
is true. In theory-based characterizations of trade, perfect competition is achieved
by assuming that the number of investor agents in t he market is large (typically,
count ably infinite). This ensures that while prices reflect the combined decisions of all
market participants at an aggregate level, t he actions of each individual market agent
are sufficiently atomistic as to have no appreciable effect on price. B y all accounts
perfect competition seems to be a reasonable assumption about markets that are deep
and / or assets that are widely traded. In addition, suffice it to say here that one reason
why perfect competition is a favored vehicle for disclosure association studies is that
it simplifies considerably the "game" that market agents play towards determining
the market equilibrium price. That is, by v irtue of the fact that each individual
investor agent can ignore the effect of his or her action on price, determining an
equilibrium price is simplified considerably, but especially in circumstances in which
trade is assumed to occur over multiple periods (which I discuss b elow ).
In conjunction w ith p erfect competition, I also appeal to Walras.12 Walras' notion
of how market clearing prices are det ermined in markets where divisible assets (e.g .,
firm shares) are exchanged could be describ ed somewhat colloquially as follows . First,
investors submit their demand curves for an a sset to a beneficent and altruistic market
maker (commonly referred to as a ''Walrasian auctioneer") . Investors' demand curves
12See

Walras [1881]; see a lso Wald [1951].
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represent t heir demands for the asset as a function of the price of the asset . Armed
wit h this information, the W alrasian auctio neer d etermines the price t hat equates the
aggregate demand for the a sset (i.e., the aggregation of indiv idual demand curves) to
the t otal aggregat e supply. T his price "clears the market," a nd hence represents the
equilibrium.
N ow consider invest or i's d emand for the asset whose value is uncertain versus
the asset whose value remains fixed at 1, condit ional on his private information

Z; .

Let D; represent the demand for uncertain-va lued asset and B ; represent the demand
for the asset whose value is fixed at 1. The p rice at w hich the former t rades is Pr,
and t he price at which the latter trades is 1. Thu s, the value of investor i 's endowed
portfolio is x ;Pr

+ b;.

The cost of holding a portfolio represented by D; and B; is

D;Pr + B ;, and the return on holding that p ortfolio is D;u

+ B; .

Taken all t ogether,

this implies that the net return for hold ing a portfolio represented by Di and B; (and
net ofthe proceeds from the value of i's endowed portfolio) is D;(u - Pr) +x;Pr + b;.
The expected value of this port folio to investor i, based on his private inform ation
and y, is E[U (D;(ii - Pr)

z;

+ xiPT + b;) IY, z;].

To determine a value for Pr, first I must compute each investor's demand forD;
and B ;. W hen the negative exponential utility function is used in combination w ith
the normal distribution function, it yields a result that is linear in t he argument of
t he exponential: that is,

E [U (Di(ii - Pr)

+ x ;Pr + bi) IY,zi]

1
1 2
1
1
1
- exp[--D;E[ii ly , zi ] + - 2 D ; VAR [u iy, z ;] + -DiPr - - x; Pr- - b;].
r
2r
r
r
r
In determining his opt imal portfolio, each investor chooses D; so as to maximize the
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above. This yields

Di = r E[u ly, z;] - Pr.
VAR [u ly, z;]
This is a standard demand equation result ing from the negativ e ex p onent ial in conjunctio n w ith the normal distribution. It suggest s that t he demand for t he a sset is
equal to: a n investor's expectation of the value of the a sset conditiona l on his privat e
informatio n a nd the d isclosure, minus the price of the asset; an adjustment for his
t olerance for risk (i.e., r ); and an adjustment for (in the d enominator) t he confiden ce
he h as in his posterior exp ect ations (i.e ., VAR [uly,z;]) . Straightforward result s from
multiva riate norma lity imply t hat E [uly, z;] = m

+ h +~ +s (y- m) + h+ ~+Jz; - m) a nd

VAR [u ly, z;] = h + ~ + s. Consequently, D ; can be rewritten as
D; = r (hm

+ ny + sz ; -

{h + n

+ s }Pr).

N ow our st ated goal remains to endogenize Pr . Pr is determined by equating
the per-capita supply of the asset (i.e. , the uncertain-valued asset ) with per-capita
demand; the Pr that achieves t his , i.e. , x =

Pr =

1

h

h

+n +s

( hm

2.:; (x;jN) = 2.:; (D;jN),

+ nfj + s

lim - 1
N

N ->co

1 (hm + n fj + su +n + s

is

1 )
L z; - -x
r
i

~x)
.
r

Hence,

Pr-Pr-1=

1

h+n+s

(n (y - m) + s(u - m)- ~x)
.
r

Note that E [Pr] = m and E [Pr - Pr- 1] = 0. An interpretation of Pr - Pr- 1
that it represents: the change in the expect ation of

u averaged

IS

across a ll investors,

w here t he change is adjust ed for t he posterior precision of t heir expectations based
on t heir knowledge of y a nd z; ; and a djusted furt her by t he per-capita supply of the
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uncertain-valued asset (w hich is also adjusted for investors ' tolerance for risk, r ). The
"supply adjustment ," -

r (h+,n+s)

x, can be thought of as the extent to which the price

of the asset at timeT, PT, must be reduced below variables whose expected value is

m, the expected value of the asset (i.e., E [ h+~+s (hm

+ny + su)] = m ), to attract

investors w ho are risk-averse (assuming that the realization of the per-capita supply
of the asset, i.e., x, is p ositive) . If, for example, investors' tolerance for risk is very
large, which implies t hat they are approximately risk-neutral, then r

-----+

oo a nd the

adjustment is 0. Similarly, if the precision of their posterior expectations is very large,

+ n + s-----+

which implies that they a re almost certain of the asset's value, then h

oo

and once again the adjustment is 0.
To digress briefly, another maintained assumption is that there exists a continuum
of traders . Consequentl y, one cannot talk meaningfully about how increasing the
investor base (i.e., the number of people who participate in the market) affects prices
or price changes. Note, however, that r is per-capita risk tolerance. As such, one
could interpret r as a proxy for investor base: that is, as the investor base increases,

r mcreases.

Allow ing this interpret ation and assuming for the moment that the

realization of the per-capita supply of the asset is posit ive (i.e. , xis positive), this
implies that a n increase in investor base (i.e., r) result s in an increase in the change
in price: effectively, an increase in returns.l 3
The salient feature of this model is that the DRC declines to

-h n

+n+s

.

As discussed

previously, the reason for its decline is that there now exists in the economy private
informatio n, in the form of the zi's , and this lessens t he reliance of price on disclosure.
l 3See, for example, Merton [1987]. Note that if there were only a finite number of market participants, it would be m ore transparent that as t heir number increased (i.e. , as the investor base
increased), t h e supply adjustment would decrease, and hence the cha nge in price would increase.
Making the number of market participants finite, howev er, creates problems in conjunction with
assuming perfect competition.
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With rega rd to t his m odel's .6. %-st atistic, one interpret a tion of per-capit a supply
is tha t it represents a variable unrelat ed to t he a sset's true, economic valu e, but which
non etheless a ffect s price cha nge t hrough t he su p ply of t h e a sset (and risk aversion) .
A s such, in the context of this discussion I interpret p er-capita supply,

x, a s a proxy for

2, d iscussed previo usly. Using x as a proxy for ~' V AR[Pr (h+~+sl (n 2 (h:nn) + 2ns~ +s2k) and VAR [Pr- Pr-1l y,x] = (h+~+s)

the noise term,

2

Pr-1 lx] =

c:n):

n ote

t hat it is not necessary t o cont rol for pr ice at t imeT- 1 in t hese expressions b ecaus e

Pr -1 is fix ed at m. Consequent ly, here the .6. %-stat ist ic red uces to
s2

.6.%

h+n

1_

(h+n)
hn + 2nslh+ s 21h
n 2 (h+n
n_n)
hn ) + 2n s lh+ 82_h(h+
n 2 (h+
hnn) + 2nslh + s21h
w hich is clearly less than 1 b eca use h(hr:_n) < k· In ot her words , consistent
n2

w ith the

decline in t he DRC, in this m odel disclosure expla ins less t ha n 100% of t he variability
in price change. T he reason fo r this should be clear: in t his variat ion there exists
privat e, as well as p u b lic, informat ion ab out t he value of t he a sset. Ha d , for example,
t here been no pr ivate informat ion (i.e ., s = 0), t hen here once again t he .6.%-statist ic
would b e 1.
To summa rize t he analysis t o t his p oint, a s a ch aracterizat ion of the associatio n
between d isclosure a nd price change, a Walrasian m odel ha s ma ny ap pealing features.
But it is n ot wit hout controversy, which is the m otivation for o ur next section.

Rat ional Infe rences from Market Pric es (model #3) . 14 W hile Walras'
notion of perfect com p et ition offers ma ny insight s into t he price setting process, it
14Jn conjunction with model # 3, see Hellwig [1980], Diamond an d Ver r ecchia [1981], and Lundholm
[1988]. W it h r egard t o the last p a p er , not e that Lund h olm's chief concern is the role of cor related errors , whereas a m aintained a ss umption through out this ana lysis is that all error ter ms are
u ncorrelat ed.
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can nonet heless be argued that it is conceptually flawed . Implicit in a Walrasian
equilibrium is the not ion t hat investors' b eliefs about w hat the a sset is worth are
fixed, or invariant, t o the price at w hich the market cleared . This was sometimes
referred to as an "exogenous beliefs" model. The conceptual flaw in a n exogenous
beliefs m odel is tha t if investors are able t o submit a n entire demand curve to an
auctioneer, then they should also b e able t o submit demand curves based o n their
expectations of what an asset is worth as a function of the market-clearing price. In
other words, if t heir d emands are a function of price, then their beliefs can also be
a function of price, w hich, in turn, can affect their demands. 15 Market equilibria in
which investors condition their expectations over the price at which markets clear are
dubbed ''ratio nal expectations" models of trade.
An intuitive way to distinguish between a Walrasian and a rat ional expectations
model of tra de is t o imagine first a price setting process un der Walras. H ere, investors
determine their demand for an asset based on their tolerance for risk, information
about w hat the asset is worth , and other preference characteristics. Then they submit t heir demand curves to an auctioneer, w ho determines the price at which the
supply of the asset equilibrates against the aggregate demand. Now s uppose t h at
the auctioneer calls out t he market-clearing p rice she determines. In Walras, not hing
more would happen - this price would be the price at which trades are executed. In
a rational expectations equilibrium, however, investors would start g rumbling "well,
ha d I known in advance that t he market-clearing price was t o be the one that was
ultimately called out, then I would have changed my beliefs accordingly, and submitted a d ifferent demand curve." Presumably t his grumbling would abrogat e the
equilibrium, and t he auctioneer would be compelled to a llow investors t o submit a
15See Grossman [1976, 1978].
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second round of demand curves, based o n their revised b eliefs. Now imagine a second
round of trade in which a different market clearing price is called out, and once again
investors g rumble t hat had t hey known t hat t his revised price was to be t he market
clearing price, they would have submitt ed yet anoth er set of dema nd curves. And so
on and so forth, until eventually the auctioneer calls out a price, a nd at that price no
investor ha s a ny desire to recontract (e.g., they would cease grumbling) . The price
at which investors have no further interest in recontacting would be the rational ex-

pectations market clearing price. Stated somewhat differently, in W alras' set t ing the
market -clearing price of a n a sset is a function of investors ' expectatio ns, but not the
reverse, whereas in a rational expectations eq uilibrium, price is a function of expectations and expectations are a function of price. Note that the expression "ratio nal
expectations" t o describe models in this genre of literature is somewhat misleading
in that these m odels sim ply introduce as a m odeling innovation the requirement t h at
investor agents condition their expectations on market-clearing prices . Perhaps as an
alternative one sh ould dub this research "price-conditioned" models of trade.
"Trading-up" from a W alrasian to a rat ional expectations model of trade requires
some additional analysis . In particular, t he key feature of a rational expectat ions
equilibrium is t hat investors conjecture that the market -clearing price of the asset
contains information about what the asset is worth. Consequently, when investors
condition t heir expectatio ns over price, in a dd ition t o t heir private information, they
glean more insight into the asset's uncertain va lue than ha d t hey ignored price. Here,
I continue with all the assumptions int roduced previously, but , in addit ion, assume
that investors conjecture tha t the m a rket equilibrium price at time T is of the form
Pr

= a + bii + cfj - dx,
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where a, b, and care fixed p ara met ers. Define

_

q

The variable

q represents

Pr - a -

=

cy

b

q as

_

=U

d_
-

- X.

b

t he additional information investors glean from price by

manipulat ing it to yield t he essent ia l information a bout

u. When investors use q in

conjunction w ith u, f), and i;, a quarto-variate normal d istribution results with m eans
of (m , m , m, m) and a covariance matrix given by

h-1
h-1

h-1
h-1

+ n -1

h-1

h-1

h-1

h-1

h-1

h-1

h-1

h-1

h-1

+ 8-1

h-1

h-1
h-1

+ (~f c1

Consequently, when invest ors condition t heir expectations over disclosure, their privat e information, a nd price (through q) as an addition al source of information, their
expect ations are

_

E [u ly, z; , q] =

hm + ny + sz; + (£)

2

tq

h + n + s +(~) t

,

and the precision of their expectations, (VAR [u ly , z; , q])- 1, is

(VAR [U[y, z ;,q]) -

1

~ h + n + s + ( £)' t.

To determine a value for Pr, once again first I must compute each investor 's
demand for D;. As before, the negative exponential utility function yields a result
that is linear in the argument of the exponential: that is,

E[U (D;(u - Pr) + x ;Pr
1
- exp[--D;E[u ly, z;, q]

r

+ b; ) IY, Z; , q]
1 2
D; V AR [u ly, z ;, q]
2r 2

+-
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1

1

r

r

+ - D ;Pr- - x ;Pr -

1
- b;] .

r

In determining his opt imal portfolio, each invest or chooses Di so a s to max imize the
a b ove. This yields

w hich is the same ex pression as b efore except for t he fact t hat now investors are conditioning their expectations on price (t hrough q) in ad dit ion t o y and

Z; .

C onsequently,

D ; can b e rewrit ten a s

As befo re, I endogenize Pr by equa ting t he per-capit a supply of the uncert ainvalued asset w ith the per-capital demand: in other words, by set ting x

L; (D;/N ).

= L i (x;jN ) =

When on e does this, t he value of Pr that results is
1
- - -- - - - - , r - ( hm + nfj
h + n + s + (~) 2 t \

(!!.)
d

2

tq + s lim
N ---->oo

2

1
h

+

+ n + s + (~)

t

_.!._
N

(hm + nfj + (s + (!!.) t) u d

Note that for investors' original conjecture t hat Pr

=

:L z;- .!.x\}
i

r

(.r!. + !!.t)
x) .
d

a+ bu + cy - dx to b e s elf-

fulfilling (i.e. , rat io nal) , it must b e that

b

s

d

w hich implies ~

= rs.

+ (~f t
1r + dE.t '

Hence, a self-fulfilling equilib rium can be chara cterized by the

coefficients a, b, c, and d in t he expression Pr
fo rms: a

=

hm
.
h + n + s +(r s) t '

b=

2

s + (r s) t
.
h + n+ s + ( r s ) t '

c

=

=

a+bu+cfj - dx assuming the follow ing

n
.
h+ n +s+ (r s) t '

and d

= ..,....--'-----,,........,...-r-

in turn, implies

Pr - Pr-1

=

1
2 2
t
h+n +s+rs

( n (f) - m) +
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(s + r2 s2t) (u - m) - (.!.r + rst) x) .

Note that this express10n for t he change in price is identical to the previOus case,
ex cept for the addit ional information related t o conditioning ex pectat ions over price.
In effect, conditioning expectations over price creates an additional "information kick"
that results in more precise beliefs in the rational expectations model than in the
Walrasian m odel. Specifically, the precision of expectations in the former is h

+n +

s + r 2 s 2 t, and in the latter h + n + s. This implies that the "information kick" is r 2 s 2 t.
Here, the DRC also reflects the additional informat ion gleaned from price: specifically, the DRC is

h + n+ : +r2s 2t.

The DRC is lower than in the Walrasian case because

investors rely in part on price in a rational expectat ions model, and hence rely correspondingly less on disclosure. In addition, note that in t his model VAR[Pr-Pr~l lx] =

(h+n+~+rzs2t )
2 2

)
s +r s t
( h+n+s
+ rLsLt

2
(n

2

2

( hh:n )

1-)
(h+n ·

+ 2n (s + r 2 s 2 t) t + (s + r 2 s 2 t) 2 t)

Consequently, here the .6. %-stat istic reduces to
( s +r 2 s 2 t )

.6.%

and V AR[Pr-Pr-liY, x] =

1-

2

h+ n
2 2

+ 2n (s + r s t) t + (s + r 2 s 2t) 2 t
n 2 ( hh+n)
+ 2n (s + r 2 s 2t) 1h + (s + r 2 s 2t )2 _Mhn_+ ~
n
n

2

(h:nn )

As in the Walrasian case, the .6. %-sta tistic in the rational expectations model is
less than 1. The .6. %-statistic in the rational expectations case, h owever, is lower
than in the Walrasian case (I leave this as an exercise for the interested reader) .
This suggests that the a dditional information about the asset glea ned from price
in a rational exp ectations model implies less reliance on disclosure, and hence less
variability in price change at time T explained by disclosure at time T.
Before proceeding to the next model, let me mention the role of two more maintained assumptions. Among the various conjectures that invest ors could make about
the market equilibrium price at timeT, a maintained assumption in the "rational ex26

pectations" literature is t hat invest o rs m ake linear conjectures a bout t he functiona l
fo rm of the market clearing price : t hat is, Pr = a

+ bu + cy - dx .

This in no w ay

precludes, or rules out , t he p ossibilit y t ha t t here exist other, nonlinear conjectures
that also lead t o self-fulfilling equilibria. T hese alternative conjectures are s imply not
studied . N ote t hat this restriction to linear conj ectures is not uniqu e to t his lit erat ure. Models of imp erfect compet itio n , w hich are d iscussed b elow, are also premised
on linea r conjectu res about t he functional form of price. 16
A noth er mainta ined assu m ption in model #3 is t hat invest ors have diverse privat e
informa tio n. A competing m odel to t he on e d iscussed here is one in which invest ors
are only one of two t y p es: informed, a nd uninformed who glean some knowledge by
conditioning t heir b eliefs on price. 17 In t he lat t er mo del price is only a communicator
of information from t he in form ed to the uninformed. Alt ernatively, in model #3 price
is b oth an aggregator of informat ion in t hat price a ggregates the d ivers e b eliefs of
many invest ors (as manifest in the

zi ), and a com m un icator of t h is aggregat ed data.

Rational Anticipation of Disclosure (model #4). 18 W hile a llowing r ationa l
inferences from prices a ppea rs t o be a clear improvem ent over the W alrasian model at
relat ively litt le cost in tract a bility, argua bly t h ere is yet anot her flaw. The flaw is t h at
as t h e market setting was describ ed a b ove, t here is no prior round of t rade that a llows
market participants to resolve t heir differences (e.g., d ifferences in risk pr eferences,
differences in end ow ments, d ifferences in private beliefs) p rior t o disclosure. R esolv ing
differences t hrough a prior r ound of trade is crucial t o an association study, because
wit hout it a host of other factors u nrelated to disclosure a re com m ingled int o the
l 6See , for example, the d iscussion of m od el #8 b elow .
l 7See, for example, G rossman an d Stiglitz [1980] a n d Demski and Feltham [1994].
l 8Jn conjunction with m odel # 4 , see Grundy a nd McNichols [1989] and Brow n and Jenn ings [1989] .
Not e t h a t in Grund y a nd Mc Nichols investors' preannouncem ent inform a tion structure consists of
a commo n prior, privat e in formation w ith common error , and id iosy ncr atic errors wit h iden t ical
p recision, w hereas here the common error t erm is ignored.
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change in price at the time of disclosure. For example, imagine a setting in which
market pa rticipants enter a m arket at the b eginning of the period to exchange shares
of an a sset and, based on their demands , a ma rket-clearing p rice is established at the
end of t he p eriod. In addition, imagine that as t hey enter t he market, t here is some
public disclosure about t he asset's value. In this scenario the end-of-perio d market
price commingles different risk preferences, different endowment s of the risky asset,
and different private beliefs, along w ith disclosure. Consequently, here it is d ifficult
to infer conclusively the effect of d isclosure on price, sepa rate a nd apart from all the
other reasons why participants tra de .
The way around t his problem is to first allow market participants some pnor
round of trade before disclosure occurs, a nd t hen have a second round when disclosure occurs. It is important t o require, however, that in the first round of trade
market participants anticipate disclosure in t he second round. The advantage of this
approach is that any price change that results from the second round of trade represents conclusively the effect of disclosure on prices and price changes. The problem
is that it is technically very difficult to allow for t wo rounds of trad e and also satisfy
all the other ration ality criteria discussed above .
To illustrate some of t hese issues, consider the following p roposal. Let us imagine
that a prior round of trade in the asset takes place at time T - 1, and the disclosure
of fj = y occurs at t ime T. In a rational expectations model, investors are exp ected to
learn from prices : that is, condition t heir expectations over prices. In two rounds of
trade, in principle investors at t ime T should be able to condition their expectations
over prices at both t imes T - 1 and T . But in a rationa l expectations model of
trade, prices at t imes T- 1 and T could be described as being of the form Pr -1 =

ar-1

+ br-1'fi -

dr-1 x and Pr

= ar + bru + crff - drx .
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In addition, as all fixed

paramet ers are assumed to be common know ledge in rational trading m odels (i.e.,

ar-1 , ar, br-1, etc.), Pr-1 a nd Pr represent a system of two simultaneo us equations

u and x. Consequently, if per-capit a s upply is the same at b oth
times T- 1 and T (i.e., x = x at bot h t imes T- 1 and T), t hen either Pr-1 and Pr
fully reveal u and x or Pr-1 and Pr are redundant. The fo rmer occurs if Pr-1 and
in t wo unknowns,

-

-

-

Pr are independent equations, while the latter o ccurs if Pr-1 a nd Pr are dependent
equatio ns (i.e ., ar-1 = ar , br-1 = br, et c.) . For example, Pr-b~-::_~T- 1 =
A--aT-c TY
bT
.

=

u- ~x.
bT
.

Alternatively, 1f

d
1
bT- =
T-1

Thus ' if

d T-

d

-

!:I.b

T

1

~_1

-1- ~
I
bT

then

FT _1

and

FT

u-

:~=~ x and

fully rev eal

u and x.

-

then Pr-1 and Pr are redundant.

While bot h a fully revealing and price-redunda nt equilibria are possible, dep ending
upon investors' conjectures, the ad vantage of focusing exclusively on t he lat ter is that
there is lit tle eviden ce that prices "fully revea l" an asset's value in real institutional
settings . More significantly, the price-redunda nt equilibrium can be shown to be the
generic equilibri um. 19
In t he context of our assumptions, one can show t hat allow ing investors to trade
in a prior period yields the following expression for price at time T - 1

Pr-1

1
=

2 2
h+s + rst

(hm + (s + r 2 s 2 t)

u- (.!r + rst) x).

To digress briefly, this expression for Pr-1 is highly reminiscent of the one for price at
time T in the previous model (model #3) , except for the fact that it does not include
disclosure (i.e., iJ). In other words, except for disclosure, Pr-1 in this model is the
same ex pression as Pr in model # 3 . Despite t he similarity, not e that Pr in m odel
# 3 results fro m investors behaving myopically in the sense of failing to ant icipat e
disclosure at time T; alternatively, Pr -1 in this model ev olves endogenously, and zs
l 9See the discussion in appendix Al of Kim and V erre cchia [1991b].
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based on investors rationally anticipating disclosure at time T. C ontinuing, one can
show that the price of the asset at time T is

Consequently, after some algebraic manipulation, I get

An interpretatio n of the expression

is that it is the disclosure "surprise" in price change a nd the ex pression

is the "noise."
To digress briefly, the significance of two periods is t hat it allows one to study
the change in the behav ior of price coincident with a disclosure (e.g., an earnings
announcement). As for t he a ssumpt ion that the level of noise is the same in both
periods (i.e. ,

x=

x in periods T- 1 and T ), recall t hat

x represents liquidity and/or

asset supply shocks . Hence, one could interpret this assumption as suggesting that
there is a sustained level of liquidity a nd/or supply shock a ctivity surrounding an
earnings a nnouncement (i.e ., immediately b efore and after).

The primary role of

this assumption , however, is convenience a nd transparency; generalizations to more
complex settings a re straightforward. 20
Continuing w ith our discussion of this mo del, note that the DRC is the same in
both the rational a nticipation and non-a nticipation-of-disclosure models , specifically,
2DSee, for example, He and Wang [1995].
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n

D espite t his, t he ~ %-statistic for the rational anticipation m odel can

be show n t o b e 1. Init ially, this result may seem surprising, b ut good econo mic
intuit ion suggest s why. R ecall that in calculating o ur ~%-statistic, I hold constant
the price of t he asset at time T - 1 (i.e., Pr-1). Consequently, if investors t rade
t o an equilibriwn at t ime T - 1 in anticipation of disclosure a t t ime T, then price
at tim e T - 1 accounts for all the variability in our model except for dis closure at
time T . T hus, disclosure at t ime T explains all t he variability of price. In other
words, the fact t hat the ~%-statistic is 1 points out one of the compelling features of
the rational-anticipation-of-disclosure model: all the varia bility in price cha nge arises
exclusiv ely from disclosure (cont rolling for the behavior of price at timeT - 1).
Before proceeding to the next mo del, note that a maintained assumption is that
p rivate information is information about the uncertain asset's value (i.e., Zi = ii + Ei )
and not privat e informat ion forecasts of the disclosure (e.g. ,

zi = y + E:; ).

It is

a straightforward exercise to adapt the model presented here to allow for privat e
informa tion forecasts of t he disclosure.2 1 To preserve continuity in our d iscussion ,
however, I stay with t he former.

Private Information of Heterogeneous Quality (model #5). 22 T he m odel
developed t o t his point has many a t tractive features. Invest ors have ratio nal expectat ions in the sense t hat they condit ion their expect ations over prices and in the sense
that they a nticipate the disclosure by establish ing an equilibrium in advance of its
public d isseminatio n. The problem is that t here is no t rading volume a t t ime T , w hen
disclosure occurs . C onsequently, one could arg ue that by insisting o n a "conceptually
correct" model of t rad e, I have lost sight of the objective of the exercise.
21See Abarbanell et al. [1995] for a paper t hat incorpora t es private information forecasts of future
disclosure in a model s imilar to the one discussed here.
22Jn conjunction with model #5, see Kim and Verrecchia [1991a , 1991b].
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The reason fo r t he absence of t rad e is t hat invest ors have w hat h as been d ubbed
"concordant beliefs," in combination wit h the fa ct that t he asset a llocation achieved
in the prior round of tra de (at t ime T- 1) is ex ante Par eto efficient . In m od els
w ith these features, public disclosure generates no t rade.23 The intuition underlying
this result is that a t t im e T - 1 investors achieve asset po rt folios t hat a lign t heir
beliefs t o t he pr ice of those assets. C onsequent ly, at t ime T , d isclosure shifts price,
b ut it p reserves the a lignment because price and invest ors' b eliefs m ove in para llel.
For exa m p le, if a n investor 's va luatio n of w hat an asset is wort h relative t o the p rice
at w hich it sold is some value at t ime T- 1, disclosure at t ime T shifts beliefs and
prices, but in a fashion t hat preserves t hat value . Consequently, t here is no incentive
t o trade at time T.
T his returns us t o the role of t wo of ou r m aintained a ssumptions . H omogeneous
precisio n of private information a cross invest ors ensures ex ante Paret o efficiency
in the prior round of trade an d the negativ e ex pon ent ia l ut ility functio n ensures
concord ant b eliefs . Consequently, if we co ntinue t o maintain t hese a ssumptions, we
have reached the p rover bia l end-of-t he-road: all our efforts have led us to a world
in w hich t here is no role for disclosure. T h ere is no role for disclosure b ecause t here
is no incentive t o trad e at time T . If we a re reluctant to a ba ndo n the n egativ e
exp onential b ecause of its obvious tractability, one device to ensure that disclosure
has a role is to assu me that allocations are not ex ante P a reto efficient at t ime T - 1.
This is achieved by a ssuming t hat the p recisions of investors ' p rivat e information are
het erogeneous . For example, it is sufficient to assume t hat there exists some investors
i a nd j such that the precisions of t heir private inform ation , si and

that si

-/=

S j.

Sj,

have t he feat ure

Consequent ly, henceforth my maintained assu mpt ion is t hat for some

23See, for example , the discu ssion in M ilgro m a nd Stokey [1982]; see a lso W ilson [1968].

32

investors i and j ,

s; -::fc Sj .

To d igress briefly, one should be clear about what one is doing here. In general,
heterogeneous precisions are not a requirement to achieve trade at time T: it simply
happens that the constant risk tolerance feature of the negative exponential forces
this requirement. But this means that heterogeneous precisions in conjunctio n with
the negative exponential utility function should be interpreted properly as a proxy
for utility preferences that are more general than the negat ive ex ponential, and not
a strict requirement for trade, per se.
The shift from homogeneous to heterogeneous precisions d oes not affect the characterization of price change discussed above in model

# 4, provided that one n ow

interpret t he expression for s in the previous price change equation a b ove as the

average precision across investors: t hat is , s = limN->=~

2::; S; .

What heteroge-

neous precisions do allow, how ever, is a cha racterization of tra ding volume at t ime

T. Specifically, the (per-capita) trading volume that results when there exists some
S;

-::fc Sj

is

Volume =~2 (lim ~
I::r ls;- sl) IPr- Pr-1 1,
N .
N--->00

where, once a gain, s = lim N->oo ~

2::; s;.

'

F or example, to see the effect of heteroge-

neous precisions, not e that volume is 0 when

S;

= Sj

for all i and j .24

In effect, the compelling feature of a model of trade w ith private infor mation
of heterogeneous quality is that it results in an expression for trading volume t h at
24This a lso points up the ma jor difference b etween Kim and Verrecchia [1991a] and Grundy and
McNichols [1989], KV and GM, respectively. In GM investors' preannouncement information structure consists of a common prior and private information with common error and idiosyn cratic errors
w ith identical precision: that is, S i = Sj for all i and j. Alternatively, in KV there is no common
error, but the idiosyncratic errors have heterogen eous precisions. This expla ins why in GM there
is no tr ade in the partially revealing equilibrium: the precisions of all investors are homogeneous.
For this reason G M focus on the fully-revealing equilibrium (not t he price redunda nt equilibrium
discussed here) in which invest ors observe the market price and correct t h eir idiosyn cratic errors;
this, in turn, results in tra d e.
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is the product of the average, absolute-va lue difference in the quality of investors'
private information, i.e.,

! (limN->oo }v L:i rlsi - sl), and absolute-value price change,

i.e ., IPr- Pr-1 1· Among other things, this relat ion ex plains the p ositive association
between trading volume and absolut e value price change co mmonly cited in the literature.25 The relation itself is very intuit ive in that it suggests that t rading volume
is the product of the extent to which investors h old diverse opinions at an idiosyncratic level through their heterogeneous, privat e precis ion si weights, and the extent
t o which these opinions change on average at t he time of disclosure t hrough Pr- Pr-1·
But, a s I discuss b elow , a problem rem a ins .

Heterogeneous Interpretations of a Common Disclosure (model #6). 26
A maintained assumption throug hout the analysis h as b een that investors interp ret disclosure in some common fashion.

One artifact of common interpretations

of disclosure is t hat the characterizat ion for t rading volume implied by the previous
equation suggests that volume is rela t ed to absolute value price change through the

! ( ~ L:i rlsi - sl), but with a zero intercept. For exa mple, Volume
a + fJ IPr- Pr-1 1, where (3 =! ( ~ L:; rlsi - sl) and a = 0.

coefficient

=

A zero intercept implies that t rading volume cannot a rise in the absence of price
change. B ut this rela tion has been criticized by t hose who claim t hat empirically
volume arises even in the absence of price change. 27 So t he q uestion now is: how
might one extend t he model further t o address this concern ? In other words, how
might it be possible t o characterize t rad ing volume in the absence of price changes?
One way to extend the model to incorp orat e t he p ossibility of volume even in
the absence of price chan ges is to allow investors t o int erpret disclosure diversely.
25See, for example, Karp off [1987).
26Jn conjunction with mo del #6, see Dontoh and Ronen [1993), Harris a nd R aviv [1995), K a ndel
and Pearson [1995), and Kim and Verrecchia [1997).
27See K a ndel and Pea rson [1995).
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Account ing research has long debated t he extent t o w h ich disclosure is int erpreted
similarly versus dissimila rly by market part icipants, and in the a ccounting lit era ture there exists many characterizations of a common d isclosure being inter preted
diversely. 28 To inco rporate t hat possibility of diverse interpret ations, first recall that
fj

=

u + fj.

Suppose that in addition to privat e information a b out

u directly t hroug h

Zi, investors also possess private information about fj, in the form of 0 ;

=

fj - Wi,

w here the w;'s have a normal distribution w it h m ean 0 and p recisions wi . Institutionally, Oi can be thought of as the information an investor glea ns by studying the error
in disclosures, w here the error arises from t he applicat ion of random, liberal, or conservative accrual-based accounting practices and estimates . When there is d isclosure,
this informat ion can t hen be used t o partia lly correct for the error.
When diverse interpretat ions of a common d isclosure are added to our previous
assumptio ns, expected trading volume can be represented now by

1

1

E [Volume iu , Pr, Pr -1 ] = - lim - I: r l(w; - w )(u - Pr ) + (s; - s)(Pr-1- Pr) I+R ,
2N--->ooN

.

'

w here R is a (positive) residual term. 29 For example, consider the case w here t here
is no price change, t hat is , Pr = Pr-1· For this m odel specification expected t rad ing
volume arises despite the absence of p rice changes. Specifically, w hen Pr

= Pr-1

exp ect ed volume reduces t o

1
1
I:r i(wi -w )(u -Pr)l + R ,
2 N --->00 N 1.

E [Volumeiu, Pr,Pr-1] = - lim an expression t hat is always positive.

In short, this model suggest s how volume

may arise in t he a bsence of price cha nges. It must b e acknowledged, of course, that
w hile this m odel characterizes t rading volume in the absence of price changes, it lacks
28See, for example, discussions in Holtha usen a nd Verrecchia [1990], Indjejikia n [1991], and K im and
Verrecchia [1994] .
29See the discussion on pp. 408-413 of Kim and Verrecchia [1997].
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the more transparent and elegant relation between price change and trading volume
suggest ed in model # 5, Volume =

! (lim N-;co }v I:i r lsi - sl) IPr- Pr-1 1·

Suffice it

t o say that at this juncture the specification fo r t he relation between price change
an d volume in model #5 is a benchmark routinely used in empirical studies. 30
To summa rize our efforts t o this point, so far many elements of rationality and
investor diversity have been incorporat ed into the analysis. But it could be argued
also that w hatever has been accomplished has only been at t he expense of a very
parochial view of "investor diversity."

Therefo re, I explore t his issue in the next

section.

Heuristic Behavior (model #7). 31 A maintained assumption throughout our
analysis has been that all investor agents w ho participate in the market use whatever
informatio n is at their disposal, either privat e o r p ublic, in accordance w ith Bayes
rule. But is this reasona ble? Does this superimpose onto the analysis an element of
rationality that no one would expect each and every investor a gent to a chieve in all
cases ? In theory-based, economic analyses, reliance on Bayes rule is so routinized an
assumption a s rarely to warrant a ny justificatio n. The compelling feat u re of Bayes
rule is that it implies the most efficient use of information. Consequently, in market
settings, investo rs who use information more efficiently (i.e., Bayesians) should be
ab le t o ex ploit and d ominate their less efficient counterparts. In a ddition, even if
this were not the case , it could b e a rgued that B ayesian b ehav ior ca ptures well the
behavior of market participants at an aggregate level, where indiv idual, idiosyncratic
departures from Bayes rule cancel out "on average."

In other words, w hile strict

reliance on Bayes rule by everyone may seem a lit tle far-fetched , one might expect
that behaviors averaged over many people approximat e Bayesian behav ior.
30See , for example, At iase and Bamber [1994].
31Jn conjunction with model # 7, see DeLong, et al. [1990].

36

Recent ly, howev er, a fashionable element of cont emporary research in finance has
allied itself w ith studies in the psychology literature, and called into question the
degree t o which markets participants adhere to Bayes rule in real market sett ings. 32
The Bayes-rule-doubters point to the wealt h of empirical evidence that market prices
so metimes appear to overreact to events, and so metimes underreact (e.g., the postannouncement drift phenomenon). While there may be a host of reasons why markets
behave in ways that defy rational eco nomic analysis, investors' inability t o apply
correctly Bayes rule explains all manner of anomalous behavior. Consequently, this
may be an opportune time t o assess the role of this assumpt ion.
The major difficulty with substituting some heuristic use of information for Bayes
rule is that potentially it explains everything, which, in turn, suggests that it explains
nothing . For example, price underreactions are explained easily by a class of invest ors
w ho are anchored to their prior beliefs. Alternatively, overreactions are explained
easily by a class of investors w ho pla ce more weight on the m ost recent infor mation
stimulus than can be justified under Bayes Rule. In this env ironment , w hat "gro und
rules" should we require in exploring the possibility of heuristic behaviors ? I argue
that one rule should be that a heuristic behavior be survivable. There are market
settings w here this can happen.

That is, in some market settings there may be

ad vantages t o h euristic behaviors that offset t he fact t hat failure t o a dhere t o Ba yes
rule means that heuristic investors use information less efficiently t han their Bayesian
counterparts (on avera ge) . But in the absence of demonstrating conclusively that a
heuristic b ehavior can su rvive in competitio n a gainst B a yes rule, the sa fest course may
be t o continue t o assume that market participants u se information in accordance w ith
Bayes rule.
32See , for example, Thaler [1993].
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To illustrate some of these points in the context of our discussion, let me return
t o model #4 to incorpor ate the possibility of s ome measurable s et of investors behaving heuristically. As t he development of t he follow ing model is somewhat longer
than those already discussed, let me briefly p oint out its motivation. First, it demonstrates that it is difficult to reconcile heuristic behavio r with surv iva bility in m odels
of perfect competition. Second, it is useful for simply illustrating issues related to
the introduction of heuristic behavio r into models of (otherwise rational) trad e.
To start, imagine an economy in which a fraction
fraction 1-'lf are Bayesians, where 0

<

1r

1r

of invest ors are heuristic and a

< 1. To keep the discussion simple, I assume

that neither type possesses a ny private information and each is equivalently endowed:
that is, s = 0, and

X;

x and b;

= b for all inv estors i.

As purely a m odeling element ,

the introduction of heuristic b ehavior introduces subtle issues concerning the extent
to which heuristic investors are rational (and/ or B ayesian) versus the extent to which
they are heur ist ic. Specifically, in the cont ext of rational models of trade, heuristic
behavior presupposes some element of schizophrenia on the part of heuristic investors
in that it requires that they combine some elements of rational (and/ or B ayesian)
behavior along w ith some elements of heuristic behavior. T o address these issues and
for the sake of simplicity, I assume that heuristic investors are rational/Bayesia n in
all regards except for the fact that b ased on a d isclosure y, the B ayesian investor's
expect ation of firm va lue is E [u ly] = m

+ h:n(y -

m), which is the correct statistical

valuatio n, whereas the heuristic inv est or's expectation of firm value is EH [uly]
m

+

h:n (y - m).

=

This characterization of heuristic behav ior su ggests t hat w hen

() > 1 heuristic investors "overreact" t o the disclosure relative t o the unconditio nal
mean of

u, w hich

is m, whereas ()

< 1 suggests that they "underreact." D espit e

the potential over- or underreaction on the part of heuristic investors , I a ssume that
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both t y p es continue to assess posterior variances correctly: t hat is, for both invest or
t y p es V AR[uiy] = (h + n)- 1 . Let me emphasize that this characterization of heuristic
behavior is only one of many possible w ays to illustrate non-Bayesian behavior.
U sing m odel #4 as a benchmark and assuming s

=

0, one can show that the

price for t he asset at t ime T - 1 is Pr-1 = m - r~ x and at t ime T is Pr =

h~n

(hm+ nfj + nn [fj -

m ] [B- 1] - ~x) , a nd, hence, t he expression for price change

lS

Pr- Pr-1
Here the DRC is

h: n

(nB

=

_ n _ ((nB

h+n

+ 1- n) .

+ 1- n)(fj -

m)

+ ~x)
rh

.

Moreover, t he DRC is greater t han (less than)

the coefficient w ith exclusively Bayesian investors when B

> (< ) 1. In other words,

if heuristic traders "overreact" ( ''underreact") to the disclosure, price change will be
more (less) reliant on disclosure.
The only problem with this model as a characterization of heuristic behavio r is
that because the market is perfectly competitive, heuristic inv estors will a lways do
worse t han Bayesian invest ors. F irst I show this and then I discuss the intuition
underlying this observation. Using the analysis int roduced previously, a heuristic
investor's demand for the asset is

DH

=r

EH [uiy]- Pr

n

VARuy

l

= -rn (1- n) (1- B) (y- m) +X.

In comparing this expression for demand to the one derived above in m odel # 4, note
that one implication of the assumption that s = 0 is t hat investors no longer benefit from conditioning t heir expectations over price because price does not aggregate
private information. A lternativ ely, a Bayesian invest or's demand for the asset is

E [uiy] - Pr
D B = r VAR [uiy] = rnn (1- B) (y - m)
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+ x.

As a check that t hese demand characterizations are correct, not e that n DH+(1- n ) DB

x, which is w hat one would expect: total per-capita demand equals total per-capita
supply.
Now consider the respectiv e expected utilities of t he heuristic and Bayesian investors at timeT. Regardless of how the heurist ic invest or evaluates t he disclosure y,
the correct statistical valuation of u cond itional on y is E [uJy]. This implies t hat based
on a disclosure of y, the heuristic investor's expected utility (correctly evaluated) is

E[U (DH (u- Pr) + xPr + b) Jy]
1
1 2
1
1
1
- exp [-;-DHE[iiJy] + r 2 DH VAR[iiJy] + ;-DHPT- ;-xPr- ;-b],
2

whereas a Bayesian investor's expected utility is

E [U (D B(ii - Pr ) + xPr + b) Jy]
1
12
1
1
1
- exp[- ;-DBE[ii Jy] + r 2 D BVAR[uJy] +;-DEPT- -:;:xPr- -:;:b].
2

A Bayesian investor's expected utility is higher than that of a heuristic investor if the
argument in t he exponential of a Bayesia n invest or's expected ut ilit y is lower t han
that of a heurist ic investor, which happens if

this inequality can be reex pressed as

Not e, however, t hat
2

2
2)
1 rn - (1- 61 )2 (y- m ) 2 ,
(E [u- Jy] -Pr)(D B -DH )+ -1 ( DH-D
B (h+n) -1 = 2r
2 h +n
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=

and the ex pression ~r h:zn (1- 0) (y - m) is p ositive for all y # m and e
2

2

#

1. But

this implies that heuristic investors always do w orse than Bayesian invest ors, and
hence are unlikely t o surv ive.
The int uit ion underly ing this result is that in a perfectly competitive m arket no
single invest or's actions or dem a nds a ffect price. In additio n , Bayesian investors make
statistically correct portfolio rebalancing decisions (on average) in t he presence of
disclosure, w hereas heuristic invest ors make inferior portfolio rebalancing decisio ns.
Consequently, over time Bayesian behavior s hould out p erform heuristic behav iors ,
and , for this reason, presumably drive h euristic behaviors from t he ma rket. Of course,
one device t o ensure the s urvival of heurist ic tra ders is t o assume t hat these investors
have private information that is superior t o the informatio n available t o Bayesian
invest ors. In t his case the inferior use of information by heuristic trader s is offset by
their superior informatio n. But endow ing heur istic investors with superior privat e
informatio n is a bit of a dodge. The interesting question is : can they survive w hen
they are as well informed as B ayesians?

Imperfect Competition (model #8). 33 W hile the result that heuristic behav ior w ill not survive is certainly nice and tidy, it may be t hat the failure t o demonstrat e
survivability is not a consequence of heuristic b ehavior, per se, but rather the fact
that markets are assumed to be p erfectly competit ive. T o explore t his issue, first I
digress and consider the alterna tive of imperfect competition.
A maintained assumptio n t hroughout the analysis is that m a rkets are perfectly
competitive. Markets may not be perfectly competitive, h owever, when t he actions of
so me investors do indeed affect the price at which their tra des are executed. O ne way
t o ratio na lize the possibility of an investor's actions affecting price instit utionally is
33Jn conjun ction with model #8, see Kyle [1985], Admati and Pfleiderer [1988a], Kyle [1989], Kim
and Verrecchia [1994], Trueman and McNichols [1994], and Marzano [1999].
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t o imagine that t he investor agents are large inst itut ional tra ders w hose a ctions drive
markets . For example, imagine that the market is comprised of a lar ge institutional
investor and "the market," which r epresents, in effect, everyone else. For convenience,
henceforth I assume t hat b oth t he investor and ''the market" are risk-neutral, w ith
a ut ility for a n a mount of a consumable good g given by U (g ) = g. 34 I conti nue to
represent disclosure a s fj

= u+ ij , but now assume that the large instit utiona l invest or

(the investor, henceforth ) knows ij = 71 · As discussed in the context of mod el # 6, a
justificatio n for knowing 71 is that the investor studies t he firm's accounting practices
and pr ocedures well enough to understand t he errors in disclosures that a rise from the
applicat ion of random, liberal, or conservative accrual-based account ing . Knowledge
of ij = 71 in combination with fj imp lies that the invest or knows

u, t he

value of the

firm. Alternatively, I assume t hat ''the market" is not as astute about accounting
practices and procedures a s the invest or, and consequently only knows fj .
Imperfect competit ion implies that t he investor knows that his actions will have
an effect on the market price at which his trades a re executed , a nd t akes that into
consideration in submitting demand orders.

Consequently, the investor and ''the

market" play the following game. First, the investor determines the d emand order he
wants execut ed based on his knowledge of u. Then t his dema nd order gets "ba tched"
with the demand orders genera ted from random shocks in the supply of the asset,

x.

Fina lly, "the market" executes this combined dema nd order at a single price.
Let d represent t he demand order of the investor, D

= d + x the t otal or combined

demand orders of the investor a nd random supply shocks, and P t he price set by ''the
34W hile it would be a straightforward exercise to preserve t h e assumption t hat all agents have a
u t ility for a con sumable good re presented by the negative expon ential utility function a nd offer a
d iscussion = n sist ent w ith p rior models, risk n eutrality is a common assumption in the literature that
this modeling v ignet te charact erizes. C onsequently, hencefort h my maintained assumption about
u t ility preferences is t hat all m a rket agents are risk neutral.
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market" for executing orders. 35 I assume that competition to execute demand orders
forces demand orders to be executed at a price that reflects t he expected valu e of the
asset conditional on w hat ''the market" knows at the t ime the order is executed . At
the time the order is executed, ''the market " knows f; and the total demand order D.
This implies that P = E [ulf;, D]. The investor moves first in this game, and therefore
must make some assumption about how "the market" will interpret a demand order
of a particular size. I assume that the investor conjectures that the price set by ''the
market" based o n a disclosure y and the submission of a total demand order D is

P=m+ f3 (y -m)+>-.D.
In effect, t he price is a linear function of y and D. Once again, the coefficient {3 is the
DRC, w hile ).. is commonly interpreted as market depth.
The play of the t rading game can be summarized through a series of chronological
steps .
1) Firm value is realized; this is represented by
2) The variable f;

= y

u = u.

is disclosed and the investor observes

i/

= 'f] .

3) The investor submits a demand order to ''the market," which is combined w ith
random supply shocks represented by

x= x.

4) Based on the total demand order, ''the market" sets the price at which trades
are executed (i .e ., ''the market" picks P equal to the firm's expected value cond itional
on d isclosure and tot al demand). All trades are then executed at that price.
5) The firm is liquidat ed, paying out a return to shareholders of u .
The equilibrium to this game could be thought to arise from steps 3) and 4),
each of which is self-serving on the part of the indiv idual who executes the step. For
35For notational convenience, henceforth I drop the "T " subscript in making reference to price: m
effect, all subsequent models are treated as exclusively one-period models of trade.
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example, in step 3) the invest or det ermines his demand order d by solving
maxd · E [u- P Ju

=

d

where he conjectures t hat

P=

m

+ {3 (Y -

u, y

=

y],

m ) + >.D. T his implies that he solves

max d · E [u- m - {3(y - m) - >.(d + x) Ju = u, y = y],
d

which, in t urn, implies
d

1
2)..

= - (u - m - {3 [y - m]) .

A consequence of the investor's choice of d is t hat

u, y, and D = d +x h ave a t rivariate

normal distribution with means of (m, m, 0) a nd a covariance matrix given by
2~ h -1 (1- /3 )

L (h-1 -

!3[h-1

+ n-1 ])

In step 4) "the market" sets P conditiona l on the disclosure and the t otal demand
order received. The covariance matrix given a b ove implies that this results in the
following relation

Note, however, that for the investor's original conjecture about {3 a nd ).. to be fulfilled,
. must b e t h e case t h at {3 =
1t

(3 =

h:n and ).. = ~~-

4A.z n +t,6
4 A.2n+t + 4 A.2h ,

a n d "' =

2A.t
4 A.2n +t+ 4 A.2h.

Th"1s, 1n
. tur n, 1mp
. I"1es

In short, a self-fulfilling equilibrium is one in which the

p rice at which demand orders are executed is given by
P =m

where

+ -n-(y h+n

m)

1{,±;;

+-

2

--D,

h+n

h:nis the DRC and ~~is market depth, respectively.
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From a disclosure p erspective, this equilibrium h as a number of int erest ing features. First, unlike a model of perfect competition , t he investor does n ot go infinitely
long or infinit ely s hort in t he a sset, even though he knows t he a sset's value (i.e.,
the investor knows

u = u).

The reason for t his is that he must t ake into consider -

ation t he effect of his demand order on the price at w hich his demand order will be
executed. The larger his demand ord er (i.e. , the larger d), the more he expects it
will cost to execute that order (i.e., the higher E [P]). For exam ple, because ,.\ > 0,
when tot al demand is positive (i.e., D > 0) t he investor ha s his t rades executed at
a higher p rice than t hat implied by "the market" knowing exclusively the disclosure y (i.e. , P

=

m

+ h:n(Y -

m)). Another feature of his demand order, as well

as the total demand order, is that it is uncorrelated with the d isclosure : t hat is,

E [(y - m ) d] = E[(y - m) D] = 0 . The intuition underlying this result is that the in-

-

vestor knows y w hen he submits his demand order d, and knows that t he information
content of yw ill be fully priced in P when his demand order is executed because

yis

public information. Con sequently, he adjust s his dem a nd order to t a ke int o account
the effect of the disclosure on price, w hich is tantamount to ensuring t hat his demand
order and the disclosure are uncorrelated. Finally, note that the DRC in t his model
is identical to the one that arose in the context of our model # 1, a situation in which
the only information in t he econ omy was the information that arose d irectly from
disclosure. The int uition for this is t he DRC ca ptures the effect of d isclosure, w hile
the coefficient on the tot al demand , ..\, captures the incremental knowledge t hat arises
from observing total deman d , D, in addition to t he disclosure.

Heuristic Behavior Revisited (model #9). 36 Having laid out t he notion of
imperfect competit ion, now I revisit heuristic behavior in the context of a model of
36Jn conjunction w ith model #9, see Pala mino (1996], K yle a nd Wang [1997], and Fisch er and
Verrecchia [1999].
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this type. What I hope to show here is that w hen heuristic behavior is combined
with imperfect competition, there is a possibility of a heuristic trader surviving in
competition with a (rational) Bayesian investor. The rationale for this is that w hen
an investor's actions affect price, placing more weight on disclosure than that implied
by Bayes rule will driv e prices in t he direction of the disclosure. For example, in the
presence of "good news," a heuristic investor who places more weight on disclosure
than that implied by Bayes rule will drive prices up further on "good news" than
could otherwise be justified by "correct" (i.e., Bayesian) valuation. But a (ra tional)
Bayesian investor, knowing this, will reduce his demand because he seeks to avoid
paymg a price for the asset beyond the one implied by correct valuat ion. But in
"b acking off" part of his demand, a Bayesian, in turn, reduces price through his
actions, and this accommodation t o heuristic b ehavior allows heuristic t raders t o
pay less for their greater share of the ass et tha n they would otherwise be able to
achieve. Consequently, even thoug h heuristic traders use disclosure less capably than
Bayesians, B a yesians may accommodat e heuristic traders in a fashion that result s in
their heuristic motivated tra n sactions being executed at more favorable prices. Here,
it may be possible for heuristic and Bayesian investors to bot h survive, prov ided that
the accommodation afforded by the latter perfectly offsets t he decreased capabilities
of the former a s users of info rmation.
To illustrate t his point, consider an economy inhabited by t wo "large" instit utional
investors, one of whom is Bayesian and the other of whom is heuristic. By "large," I
mean that both invest ors have t olerances for risk, financial reso urces, and/ or reputa tions that enable them to take very sig nificant positions in the market. In addit ion,
as a by-product of being "la rge," I assume that bot h investor types a re risk-neutra l.
The very significant positions t hese large investors take w ill, in turn, affect the price
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at which they transact. For example, based on a disclosure of y , I assume that the
price at which either large investor w ill have his or her trades for the asset executed
lS

where

/3

and A are fixed, positive coefficients, and dH and dB represent the demands

of the heuristic and Bayesian investors, respectively. The

/3

coefficient can be inter-

preted as the (exogenously specified) DRC and the A co efficient can be interpreted
as the s ensitivity of the demands of the two large traders on the price at which all
transactions are executed: in effect, market depth. For example, the latter implies
that as A increases, the price at which trades for the asset are executed increases
w hen ''large investor" net demand for t he asset is positive (i.e., dH +dB > 0 ), and
decreases when "large investor" net demand for the asset is negative.
Recall that based on a disclosure y, the Bayesian investor's expectation of firm
value is E [uly] =
value is EH[uly]

m + h:n (y- m) and the heuristic investor's expectation of firm
= m + h:ne (y- m). As the heuristic investor values the firm at

E H [uly] based on the disclosure and must pay a price P , he chooses dH to maximize

the following objective function

This function is concave and maximized at
dH =

1
A (EH [u ly ] - m 2

/3 (y - m)- AdB)·

Similarly, the Bayesian investor's choice of dB is optimal at
dB

=

~(E
[uiy] 2A

m - {3 (y - m) -
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AdH ).

Solving for dH and dB, in equilibrium the heuristic and Bayesian investors choose,
respectively,

~
(2EH[iiJ y] 3).

E [ii Jy] - m- {3 (y - m )), and

1

,\ (2E [ii Jy]- EH [ii Jy] - m- f3 (y - m )) .
3
This, in turn, implies that in equilibrium

P

m + f3 (y-m) + >.(dH + dB)

k(m + f3 (y- m) + EH[ii Jy] + E [ii Jy]) .
Now consider the respectiv e expected utilities of t he heuristic and Bayesian investors. Regardless of how the heuristic inv estor evaluates the disclosure y , once
again t he correct statistical va luation of ii conditional on y is E [ii Jy]. This imp lies
that based on a disclosure of y, the heuristic investor's expected utility (correctly
evaluated) for having his trade executed is EUH (y) = dH (E[iiJy] - P), whereas the
Bayesian investor's expected utility is EUB (y) = dB (E[ii Jy] - P ) . Consequently,
here the difference in the respective expected utilit ies of the heurist ic a nd Bayesian
invest ors can be shown to be
EUH (y)- EUB (Y)

\ (EH[iiJy] - E [iiJy]) (2E[ii Jy] - EH[ii Jy] - m - f3 (y - m))
3

~
(-n-) (8- 1) (-n(2- B) 3). h + n
h+n

f3) (y - m )

2

.

h:n) {3.
( h:n) {3]

This expression is concave in() and equals 0 at t wo points: () = 1 and() = 2 - (
Assume that 2- (

h:n) {3 > 1. This implies t hat for any() in the interval [1 , 2-

t he heuristic invest or does better than t he Bayesian investor. Similarly, assume 2 -

(h:n) f3 < 1. T his implies t hat

for any() in the interval
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[2 - ( h:n) {3, 1] the heuristic

investor also does b ett er. In other words, as long as there is some interval between 1
and 2 - ( h~n) (3, and () is in that interval, the heuristic investo r w ill outperform the
Bayesian o n average. In particular, note that when()

=

2- ( h~n ) (3

-::/= 1, the heuristic

investor is not Bayesian and yet both do equally well.
In addition, note that a() above 1 implies that the heuristic investor "overreacts" to
the disclosure, while a B below 1 implies that a heuristic investor "underreacts" to the
disclosure. Consequently, there exist "overreacting'' and "underreacting" behaviors
for w hich the heuristic invest or does better t han the Bayesian investor, despite the fact
that the heuristic investor's valuation of the asset (i.e., u) conditional on disclosure
(i.e., y) is inferior to that of the Bayesian (on average), and bot h pay an identical
price for buying and selling the asset.
Before I conclude, however, n ote the role of the DRC. In the d iscussion of the
previous model (model #8) I showed t hat the DRC on any public disclosure was

(3 =

h:n. But (3

=

h:n' implies 2- ( h~n) (3 =

1, which, in t urn, implies that the

only value for () at which the heuristic investor does no worse than the Bayesian is
at B = 1. What is the significance of this? Well, one could int erpret a DRC of

h:n

as one in which "the market" is Bayesian on average, because from o ur discussion of
model #8 we know that

h:n is the correct (i.e., Bayesian) coefficient on price.

And

when ''the market" as a whole is Bayesian, the Bayesian investor always outperforms
the heuristic investor, absent the case in w hich B = 1, w here the heuristic investor
does equally well. But ()

=

1 implies that the heuristic investor is actually Bayesian!

So t he m oral of the story is simple . When "the market" is Bayesian on average,
a heuristic (i.e., non-Bayesian) investor will always be outperformed by a Bayesian
investor.
In short, the provocative feature of this model, in conjunction with m odel #7, is
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that it s uggests that heurist ic behavior is not survivable in either a perfectly compet it ive or imper fectly competit ive market, provided t hat, in t h e case of the latter, ''the
market" is Bayesian on average.

Conditioning Beliefs over Trading Volume (model #10) . 37 To conclud e
this essay, I consider t he role of one last mainta ined a ssumption. In all t he m od els
discussed up to t his p oint, investor a gents w ho participat e in the market, eit her as
invest ors or m arket makers, cond itio n their expectations exclusively over t otal net
demand , either ind irectly through t he m arket price (see, for example, m odels # 3-6)
or d irectly as in "the m a rket" cond itioning its expectat ions over t ot a l net demand
(see, for ex ample, mod el #8) . T h is raises t he question as t o w hether investo rs and/or
''the m a rket " would b enefit from conditioning their expectat ions over ot her variables,
like t rading volume, a nd how t his wo uld change various m arket cha racterizat ions .38
To understand some of the issues involved in including t radin g volume as a condit io ning variable , I offer a very sim ple model in w hich t his is achieved . In an att empt
t o mainta in a s fa cile an ex p ositio n a s p ossible, I empha size tha t I chose the simplest set of assumption s tha t a re st ill sufficient ly rob ust t o capt ure the p roblem. 39
E xtensions of this simple model t o more general settings should b e stra ightforward .
37In conj unction with m o del #10, see Kim a nd Verr ecchia [2001]; see also Glost en and M ilgrom
[1985] and K yle [198 5].
38Prior work on t r ading volume as a source of in formation includes Blume, et al. [1994] , wh o
propose a model of p erfect competit ion in wh ich m arket p a rticipants condition t h eir exp ect ations
over d emand a nd trading volume informat ion from the prior perio d (as well as their own current
perio d's p rivate informatio n) and Cam pbell, et al. [1993], wh o prop ose a m odel in which t rading
volume commun icates ch a nges in the d em a nd for a n asset by noninformat iona l tra d ers . Note that in
the case of t he latter , t h e trading activ ity of noninforma tional t r aders arises from t r an sitory shifts
in their t astes and p refer ences for a n a sset, a nd not information tha t is in any way superior or
d issim ilar t o pub lic knowledge.
39Sp ecifically, t he assumptions underlying t his mo del are a commingling of id eas from G losten and
M ilgrom [1985] (GM) and K yle [1985], but is unique in t he way it combines those elem ent s. For
example, as in GM , I assume t h a t t ra de in t he asset is limited to a single unit (i.e., b u y one unit or
sell one unit) , b u t , as in subsequ ent ex tensions of their work (i.e, Dia m ond a nd Verrecchia [1987])
also allow for t h e possibility that t r ade is d eferred (i.e ., n eit her b u y nor sell). In addition , as in both
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To sta rt, recall t hat t he uncertain firm value is represented by ii and has a normal
distribution with mean 0 and precision h (i.e ., t he reciprocal of variance) . Let F(u)
represent the cumulat ive probability distribution of realizations of ii and
density function. This implies that

f (u) = ~ exp[-~h (u) 2 ] .

f (u)

its

Now imagine an econ-

omy with N market participants, one of w hom is a "large," risk neutral, informed
investor. The inform ed investor observes ii = u (i.e., as in model #8 he knows firm
value) and attempts to trade on t he information . Specifically, conditional on u , the
informed investor submits a demand ord er of either 1, 0, or -1. In the context of
our model, a demand order of 0 implies that an investor defers trade. There are
also N - 1 uninformed or liquidity traders, each of whom independent ly submits a
demand order of either 1, 0, or -1. The probabilit y of an indiv idual liquidity tra der
submitting a demand order of 0 is x E (0, 1) , and the probabilit y of submitt ing an
order of either 1 or - 1 is ~ (1 - x ). With the exception of knowledge of u and the
identity of the informed investor, every feat ure of the economy is common knowledge .
As in model #8, the existence of a large informed investor suggests a model of
imperfect competit ion in which the following game is played between t he informed
investor and "the market." Let D and V represent total net d emand and total t rad ing
volume, respectively, and P the price at w h ich trades are executed by "the market
maker." Play can be summarized through a series of chronological st eps .
1) Firm value is realized; this is represented by ii = u.
2) The informed investor observes ii

= u.

GM and K y le, I a ssume that all trades are executed by a risk neutral m a rket maker who operates
in an env ironment of per fect competition. Unlike, however, either GM, w h o assumes that trades are
executed sequentially, or Kyle, w ho assumes that trades are ex ecuted based on total net demand,
I assume that trades, a n d prices at which those trades are executed, are based on order flow over
some interval of time. In this context, order-flow informa tion is equivalent to information on bot h
total net demand a nd trading volume. Through this dev ice, a sset returns in this model depend on
tra ding v olume information (among other t hings) .
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3) The (risk-neutral) informed investor and uninformed traders submit demand
orders to "the market."
4) Based on knowledge of total net demand and total trading volume that results
from these demand orders, "the (risk-neutral) market" sets t he price at which trades
are executed (i.e., "the market" picks P equal to the firm's expected value conditional
on D and V). All t rades are then executed at that price.
5) The firm is liquidat ed, paying out a return to shareholders of u .
As described above, this game is obviously reminiscent of m odel # 8. It differs,
however, in one important way : here "the market" condit ions over two sou rces of
informatio n. Specifically, "the market" also conditions over total trading volume in
addition to total net demand. More broadly, one can interpret "the market" in our
analysis as a st ylization of a market process in w hich the market price of firm shares
reacts to contemporaneous demand and volume information. 40 To explain briefly
those inferences that result from conditioning expectat ions over demand and volume.
Suppose that there are M informed investors. In addition, let N denote the total
number of market participants: that is, N = M

+ L.

Finally, let N+, N °, and

N - denote the exact numbers of each of the submitted demand orders 1, 0, and
-1. The informational benefit of observ ing V in addition t o D is that "the market"

can infer the exact numbers of each of the submitted demand orders 1, 0, and - 1.
For exa mple, it is straightforw ard exercise to verify that N +, N °, and N - can be
40The salient feature of t his model is that "the market" conditions its expectations over contem poran eou s trading volume information, in conjunction with contemporaneous information on total
n et demand. An alternative approach to the one suggested here is Blume, et al. [1994], which is
based on Hellwig's [1982] model of perfect compet ion in which information about total net demand
(through price) is learned in a subsequent period . In effect, in Blume, et al. m arket part icipants
condition their expectations over the prior period's demand and volume information.
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determined t hrough know ledge of D and V as follows

N+= _
V_+_D_
2 '

V-D

N - =--2

N° = N -V.

Alternatively, D alone only reveals the difference b etween t he number of buy orders
and the number of sell orders. In short, knowled ge of demand and volume is a finer
pa rt ition of information than demand alone, and hence should result in m ore precise
inferences.
Returning t o the game, the informed investor sub mits a demand order without
knowing the price at w hich his tra de will b e execut ed. Let d represent t he informed
investor's demand order a nd P the price at w hich trades a re executed. T he informed
investor chooses d so a s to m aximize his expected p rofit based on the effect t hat his
action has on the expected price at w hich t rades are executed

d

=

Arg max d (u - E [F id]) .

Let A be some element on R +, the posit ive ha lf-real line. Note that t he informed investor 's t rading rule or strategy can b e completely characterized by A, in the follow ing
fashion. The informed investor chooses d = 1 for all u ;::=: A such that A = E [F id = 1];
he chooses d = -1 for a ll u ::;; -A such t hat -A = E [Fid = -1] ; and he chooses

d = 0 for a ll u E (-A , A). This implies t ha t based on t his strategy, the proba bilities
that the informed investor submit s demand orders of d = 1, d = -1, and d = 0 are
1 - F (A), F (- A), and F (A) - F (-A), respectively.
Our search for an equilibrium t o this trading game is limited to one t hat fulfills
the following conj ecture on t he part of "the market" : t her e exists a A E R + such that
w hen the informed investor observes a value of u ;::=: A, t hen he submits a d emand
A

A

order of 1; when the informed investor observes a value of u between - A and A, t hen
he submits an order of 0 ; and, fina lly, w hen t he informed investor observes a value of
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u ..::; - >., then he submits an order of -1. Because of symmetry, all the results with
,.\are true with ->., with appropriate changes in sign. For this reason, we only show
and prove our results with ,.\

~

0.

An equilibrium to this game is characterized a s follows:

i} ''the market " chooses P after observing D and V based on its conjecture
that t he informed invest or uses ,.\ in ch oosing his tra ding rule;

ii) anticipating ''the market's" b ehavior, the informed investor chooses a
tra ding rule characterized by >.;

iii} in equilibrium, ). =

,.\

( ''the market " correctly anticipates the informed

invest or's t rading rule) .
Now let M

1, which implies N

=

1

=

+ L.

When ''the m arket" observes net

demand, D, and volume, V, it can infer the number of each of the 1, 0, a nd -1
demand orders. The joint probabilities of the informed demand b eing 1, 0, and -1
and a { D , V } pair a re, respectively,
Pr(d = 1, D , V) = (1- F (>.)) · (V+ D

(N - 1)!
1- X V-1 N -V
)(
) (V-D) ( - - )
x

-2- - 1'. N - V'. -2- '.

for V > -D, and Pr(d

=

1)

=

0 for V

Pr(d- 0 D V) - (F(>.)- F (->.)) .

-

'

'

-

for V < N , and Pr(d

=

0)

=

0 for V

=

=

2

-D;

1- X
(N - 1) '
·
(--)v x N (V;D)!(N - V- 1)!(V2D)!
2

V-

1

N;

(N - 1) !
1 - X V-1 N-V
Pr(d = -1 , D , V) = F(->.) · (v ; D)!(N _ V)!(v;D _ 1 )! (- 2 -)
x
for V > D, and Pr(d = -1) = 0 for V =D.
Let P (D, V : x , >.), or more simply P(D, V), be the market maker's expectation
of u after observing D and V, given x an d a conjecture >.. 4 1 From t he above relations,
41
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one can show that t he price chosen by "t he market" on the basis of a {D,V} pair ca n
be characterized as

E [u iD ,V]

P (D ,V)

E [u lu ~ >.]
Pr(d = 1, D , V) · (1) + Pr(d = 0, D , V ) · (0) + Pr(d = -1, D , V ) · ( -1)
x --~--~~~~~~~~~----~~~~~----~~~~--~
Pr(d = 1, D , V) + Pr(d = 0, D , V) + Pr(d = -1 , D , V )
E [u lu ~ >.] · (1- F (>.))x(v;n - v 2n )
(1- F (>.))x( v;D + V2D ) + (F (>.) - F ( ->.)) C;x)(N - V )
E [u lu
X

~ >.] · ( ~ )
( N - v ) {X + 1 - 2F ().)}
1
[ + V { x + 1 - 2F ().)} + N { 2F ().) - 1} (1 - X)

l

.

The informed investor's optimal trading rule is to choose d = 1 whenever u

>..

>

Therefore, "the market 's" conjecture about ). is fulfilled if and only if ).

E [P(D, V) ld

=

1]. Finally, on e can show that ).

=

E [P(D, V)ld

=

1] is equivalent

t o determining a ). t hat satisfies t he following relation

). =

E [uIu ~ >.] 1
N
( +

N

(N - V ){ X

v (

~,?;

+ 1 - 2F ().)}

V{ x+ 1- 2F (>.)}+ N {2F (>.) -1}(1- x)
(N _ 1)! C;x )v-1 xN- v )
x (N - V)! (V - B)!(B- 1)! ) .

Now consider again the expression above for price as a function of the {D, V} pair

_ _ >(D)[
V) {x+ 1-2F (>.)}
1 + v {X + 1 -(N2F- ().)}
N
+ N { 2F ().) - 1} ( 1 -

p (D , v ) - E [u Iu - >.]

l

X) .

Note that this expression is linear in t otal net demand, D , but not t rading volume,
V . T o be exclusively linear in D, it must be t hat x

+ 1 - 2F (>.) =

0; the latter

Formally, any expression, s uch as P(D, V : x , A), tha t results from the market m aker's beliefs
about A sh ould have a carot over the A (i.e. , .\) , as .\ re presents the market m aker's conjecture about
the beh avior of A. To simplify the n otion , however, I suppress the carot in my discussion.
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forces t he second expression inside the square brackets to zero. But the expression

x+1 - 2F (>.)

=

0 is equivalent to 2(1-F (>.))-(1-x) = 0. This, in turn, requires that

the probability that the informed investor participate (i.e., not defer trade), which is

2(1- F (>.) ), be equal to the probability that an uninformed t rader participate, w hich
is 1 - x . In other words, when the probability of trade is independent of type (i.e .,

2(1 - F (>.)) - (1 - x)

= 0) , trading volume plays no role! Otherwise, it does play

a role and price depends upon both t otal net demand and trading volume in some
nonlinear fashion.
Unlike previous models, note that I have not included an explicit term for disclosure (primarily to ease the notational burden) . A s an alternative, consider a concept
that is very similar t o disclosure: the amount of common knowledge, or

a priori in-

formation, available about t he asset. In the context of the model under discussion,
this is represented by h, the precision of
more

u.

In effect, increasing h is tantamount to

a priori information about the asset .42

Alternatively,

>. represents the inverse

of market depth: as,.\ declines, market depth increases. For the model proposed here,
one can show that the derivative of ,.\ with respect to h,

>.h, is negative: that is, ,.\ de-

creases as t he precision of the firm's uncertain value, h increases. Specifically, one can
show:

>.h =

-~h - 1 >.. In other words, more

a priori

information implies an increase

in market depth. There are a variety of addit ional insights arising from the relatio n
between h and ..\. For example, the likelihood of an informed investor participating
in the market is 2 (1- F (>.)). Note, however, that this likelihood is invariant with
42As su ch, it may be inappropriate to interpret has disclosure, per se, becau se changing h changes the
underlying nature of the asset. For exampl e, higher (lower) h also implies a less (more) risky asset.
Perhaps a better characterization of disclosure would be one in w hich the amount of information
a vailable about the asset's realization increases without changing its return beh avior: see Kim and
Verrecchia [2001] .
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respect to changes in h

~2(1 -F (-\))
dh

d

- 2(dh F (-\)

+f

(-\)-\h)

- (h- 1 -\f(-\)- h- 1 -\f(-\))
0.

In effect, for the n ormal distribution that I assume, any change in ,\ brought about
by a change in h offset s any change in the distribution function itself, so a s t o ensure
that

fhF (-\) = 0 .

Nonetheless, the informed investor's expected trading profits fall

as precision increases. To see this, first note that the infor med investor's expected
trading profits are given by

1]]! (t)dt + /_: -[t- E [Pid = -1]]! (t)dt
2

(1=tf (t) dt--\ [1- F (-\)])

2100

(1 - F (t )) dt,

where this computation relies on the equilibrium relation E[P id = 1] = A. Furthermore, the derivative of this expression with respect to his negative: that is,

-d2 100 (1- F (t)) dt
dh

>-

In short, an increase in comm on knowledge about the asset (i.e., an increase in h)
does not change the informed investor's expected pa rticipation, but it does reduce his
expected trading profits. The latter seems consistent with the sensible notion that
more

a priori information about u makes t he informed investor worse off by reducing

his information advantage (if not his actual participation).
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Let me summarize the implicat ions of this model as follows. To t he ex tent t o which
one believes, or ha s reaso n t o believe, tha t t rading volume informat ion is an important
conditioning variable, t his model lays out how ex pectations could b e condit ioned over
informa tio n a b o ut b oth deman d and volu m e . To t he ext ent to which one believes
that tra ding volu m e information is o nly very incremental in the presence of d emand
informa tio n, t his model suggests t hat there is a mainta ined assumptio n t ha t achieves
this. Sp ecifically, if one maintain s tha t t he likelihood of tra d e is independent of typ e,
trading volum e is a ''wash" a nd pla ys no informational role. With regard t o these t wo
beliefs, I p rofess that I am a n a gnost ic. That having been said, in the more comp lex
model I p resent here in w hich ex pectations a re condit ioned over tra ding v olume, it
should b e acknowledged tha t t he relat io n between common kn ow ledge (i.e ., h) and
m arket depth (i.e. , >.) is una ffect ed. T h at is, as in models in w hich agent s condition
ex clusiv ely over net dema nd, more common know ledge result s in mor e market depth .
Consequently, to the extent to w hich one w ant s to avoid the charge that one is
respo nding t o a n ''imagined" problem, some m ot ivatio n for including t rading v olume
as a conditioning varia ble may be required .
By way of summary let me s ay the following. As wit h a ll m a intained a ssumptions,
w het h er or n ot including volume as a condit ioning varia ble is useful dep ends u pon
t he nature of t he p roblem one is stud ying. For example, if a study is premised on the
notion t hat volu m e is a useful source of info rmation for det ermining firm value in the
p resence of an alrea d y rich disclosure environment, t hen obv iously its omission from
a m odel of t rade is a serious oversight . In t h e a bsence of t hat premise, the serio usness
of the oversig ht is unclear.

Summary.

B efore offering a summar y of t he associat ion-ba sed d isclosure, let

me first briefly list so me addit ional a ssumpt ions that were m a int ained in this ex er-
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c1se. For example, I have ignored the role of d iverse analyst and/ or management
forecasts in advance of disclosure. 43 Forecasts may represent a n additional element
of disclosure that alters all the relations discussed above. In addit ion, I have ignored the role of asymmetric tax effects in conjunction w ith disclosure. Differences
in short- a nd long-t erm capital gains t a x rates can result in a "lock-in" effect at the
time of disclosure. The lock-in effect, in turn, may da mpen price changes and tra d ing volume at the time of d isclosure (if the marginal invest or is subject to tax) .44
Also, I have endowed exogenously investor agents wit h private informa tio n. When
private information acquisition is endogen ous, however , relations among d isclosure,
price changes, and trading volume can be a ltered. This is because anticipated public
disclosure cha nges the in centives of investor a gent s to become privately informed;
t his, in turn, affects price changes and trading volume at the time of disclosure. 45
This problem is exacerbat ed w hen, in addition, t he cost of acquiring private information is not homogeneous across investors. Fina lly, I have ignored the incentives to
sell and/or distribute information.46
By way of summary, let me submit that the association-based disclosure studies have been very successful. They offer detailed characterizations of t he relations,
or associations, among disclosure, price changes, trading volume, and other market
phenomena (e.g ., market depth) for a broad class of investor-agent diversity. For
example , in t his essay I discussed invest or agents who were diversely informed, in43For a discussion of the effect s of a nalysts' forecasts, see A bar banell, et al. [1995], Ba rron, et al.
[1998], and Trueman [1996] (see also Verrecchia [1996b]).
44For suggestions as to how tax effects may affect the associations among disclosure, price changes,
and trading volume, see Shevlin and Shackelford [2000].
45See, for example, Verrecchia [1982a], Kim a nd Verrecchia [1991b], Demski and Feltham [1994],
McNichols and Trueman [1994], F ischer and Verrecchia [1998], and Barth, et al. [1999]. For a
recent paper in the economics literature that reviews briefly prior work on information acquisition
in financial market s , see Barlevy and Veronesi [2000].
46See, for example, Bushm an and Indjejikia n [1995]; see a lso Ad mati and Phleiderer [1986, 1988b].
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terpret disclosu re in diverse ways, incorporate disclosure into t heir beliefs in diverse
ways, etc. A s for the models themselves , t hey are remarkably facile a nd robust, easy
t o work w ith, a nd lea d t o a variety of interesting characterizations . It m ust also
be acknowledged, however, that a critical maintained assumption in these models is
that disclosure is exogenous . To underst and t he role of endogenous d isclosure, let us
p roceed t o the next essay.

3

Discretionary-Based Disclosure

W h at discretion does a manager or firm exercise w ith regard to the disclosure of information that m ay be useful for valuing the firm, and a bo ut which they may have
knowledge? E conomist s have long a rgued in a variety of venues that the adverseselection problem inherent in a seller simultaneously offering an asset for sale to a
potential buyer and w ithholding information about the asset's quality, propels the
seller to fully disclose t o the buyer.47 The r ationa le underlying this r esult is that
a rat ional buyer interprets withheld information as information t hat is unfavorable
about the asset's value or quality. Consequently, the buyer discounts the a sset's value
until the point at which it is in t he seller 's b est int erests to reveal t he information,
however unfavorable it may be. The notio n t hat w ithheld information can be "unraveled" by the behavior of rational buyers is a seminal result that forms the basis
for nearly all of t he subsequent research on this topic.
Extending this idea into the realm of financial reporting is not difficult . While a
considerable amount of financia l report ing is mandatory (e.g ., quarterly st atements,
annual reports, prox y stat em ents, etc.), managers m ay still posses a dditional information whose disclosure is not required - information that is nonet heless useful in
47See

Grossman and Hart [1980], Grossman [1981], and Milgrom [1981].
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valuing the firm 's future prospects. C onsequently, under w hat circumstances w ill a
manager disclose or w ithhold this information?
In the acoounting literature, early work on this q uestio n suggested the following. 48
If a manager's objective is t o maximize the current market capitalization of the firm
and there are costs associat ed with the information's disclosure, eq uilibria exist in
w hich information t hat favorably enhances the firm's current market capitalization is
disclosed, and informatio n t hat unfavorably enhances ma rket capitalization is w ithheld. In other words, there exist equilibria in which not all informat ion is disclosed.
Note, in particular, that information is wit hheld despite the fact t hat market agents
(e.g., investors) have "rational expectations" about its content: that is, t hey presume
that withheld information is less favorable information. While there are a variet y of
costs that can support the withholding of informat ion in equilibrium, a rg uably the
most compelling is the cost associated w ith disclosing information that is proprietary
in nature.
Features integra l t o this early work spawned a host of competing models of volunta ry disclosure. For ex ample, some suggested that this work offered exclusively a
theory of info rmation that is permanently wit hheld, and hence failed t o explain why
managers exercise discretion (through the timing of disclosure or forecasts) over information whose release was inevitable, like earnings announcements. 49 Others explored
the sensitiv ity of the results t o multiple signa ls. 50 Still others examined the effect of
disclosure on the expected contribution to a public good (e.g ., "free-riding'' ) a nd the
48See Verr ecchia [1983]; see also Jovanovic [1982] a nd Lanen and Verrecchia [1987].
49See, for example, Trueman [1986]. The analysis in Truem a n [1986] is more a signaling s tory
than a discretionary disclosure a nalysis in tha t t he manager unambig uously discloses informa tion
(as opp osed to exercising discretion) a s soon as he receives new information, so as to "signal" his
comp et e nce; see als o Hughes [1986]. Note that Verrecchia [1983] d oes offer a rationale for exercisin g
discretion (through the timing of disclosure) over informa tion whose release is inev itable by app ealing
to the idea that propriet a ry costs dissipate throu gh time.
50See Kirschenhei ter [1997] .
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likelihood that coop erat ive efforts colla pse.51 Fina lly, som e po inted out t he fail ure
t o consider t he int eraction bet ween either: voluntary disclosure a nd mandated disclosure, where t he requirement for m ore of the lat t er may increase the incent ives for
more of the former; or cost ly disclosure a nd costless d isclosure , w here the existence
of the fo rmer may in hi bit t he lat ter because of p ossible int erd ep end encies b etween
t he t wo. 52
Wit h rega rd to early work in t he a ccou nting literatu re, t hree issues seem ed to b e
of pa rt icular co ncern: 1) t he reliance on an exogenous proprieta ry cost t o explain
the wit hholding of informatio n; 2) the relia nce on t rut hful report ing; a nd 3) the
reliance on the manager 's objective as one of b oosting t he firm's current capita lizat ion
level, even in the event t hat this practice jeopardizes firm value in t he fut ure . W it h
r egard t o the relia nce on costs, in the disclosu re lit erature "uncertaint y" offers a n
alternat ive ra tionale for the wit hholding of informat ion in t he absen ce of a n exogenous
proprieta ry cost . For example, t here is t he possibility that information is w ithheld
b eca use uncertainty exists a b out whether the mana ger is informed or , equivalently,
w het her the informat ion in question has yet to a rriv e. 53 To digress briefly, uncertain
informa tio n existence or arriva l works like a d isclosure cost in that it creates doubt
in the minds of t he uninformed, t hereby ameliorating t he ad verse-selection problem .
Hence it supp orts t he wit hholding of information. In a dd ition to w ithholding arising
from un cert a inty a b out the existence of info rmat ion, t h er e is a lso the p ossibility
that info rmation is wit hheld beca use of uncertainty a bout ''types" : fo r ex a mple, the
51See Teoh [1997].
52See Dye [1986]: on t he topic of voluntary versus m a nda t ed d isclosure, see a lso Dy e [1 985b,1990] .
See also Gig ler a nd H em mer [1999], w ho suggest that on e role of mandatory d isclosure may b e a s a
vehicle useful in creating a n env ironment in w hich managers can credibly communica te their more
value-relevant volunta ry d isclosures. T hey refer t o t his as the "confirma tory role" of ma nda t ory
d isclosure.
53See , for example, D ye [1985a], J ung a nd Kwon [1988], a n d Dye and S rid har [1995].
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"type" of manager or the "type" of firm.

In t he case of the former, information

may be (rationally) w ithheld because it can be used to value the human capital of
the manager, a s well as the firm. 54 In the case of the latter, information may be
withheld because the immediate benefit (cost) of a favorable (unfavorable) report has
t o be weig hed against the credibility gain or loss at a subsequent date w hen more
informatio n is forthcoming. 55
With regard to the relia n ce on the exogenous restriction to truthful reporting,
some have questioned the assumption that if the manager chooses to release her private information, then she does so truthfully. Truthful reporting is t y pically justified
by appealing to the potential litigation and human capital erosion costs associated
with dissembling. While this restriction seems descriptive of many settings in accounting where audited financial statements may corroborate the manager's disclosure, there are instances , such as t he provision of forw-a rd-looking information, where
it is more difficult to assess the integrity of the manager's disclosure. 56 Persuasion
and cheap-talk games relax the restriction that the manager is obliged t o disclose
truthfully, if she discloses at a ll. In these games, the credibility of the manager's
disclosure becomes a key issue. For example, persuasion games have the feature that
while the manager need not fully reveal his private information, he may not misrepresent it: for example, the manager may vaguely claim that the firm is expected to have
earnings of at least $1 p er share when in fact he expects earnings to be exactly $1 p er
54See Nagar [1999]; see also Kim [1999].
55See Teoh and Hwang [1991].
56While on the t opic of credible disclosure, by prior agreement it was decided that contr acting
issues in general, and the Revelation Principle in particular, would fall under the auspices of a
companion survey paper, Lambert [2 000] . Specifically, Lambert [2000] discusses privat e information
and communication (in section 4) and earnings management and the Revelation Principle (in section
5). While these t opics h ave some bearing on issues discussed in this essay, we decided to allocate
them in this ma nner so as to avoid overlap in t h e respective survey s.
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share. 57 Other work in t his area examines the effect of rules governing disclosure. 58
Cheap-t alk games a re those where t he players ' payoffs are determined by t he a ction
that the manager's disclosure induces a nd not directly by his costless d isclosure. In
these games, the manager's disclosure may be false: fo r example, a manager m ay
claim t hat the firm is expected to have earnings of $2 p er share w hen in fact he
expects earnings t o b e ex actly $1 per share . Becaus e the manager is free to offer any
self-serv ing report irrespective of his privately observed , non-verifiable information,
this modeling choice is part icularly useful for examining the amount of infor matio n
a manager can communicate when t he credibility of his disclosure is a key featur e of
the environment. 59 Finally, as an alternative to cheap-talk games w here disclosure
disto rtions are cost less, the not ion of costly distortions has a lso been considered. 60
57For exa mple, interpreting t his work in a "market" context, one could suggest that M ilgrom and
Roberts (1986] conside r a game w here a m a nager a tte mpts to incr ease the stock price by convincing
investors tha t the firm has fav or able earnings prospects. Investors assume t he worst in the sense tha t
they believe that the firm 's earnings prosp ect s equal t he lowest level consis t ent with the cla im b eing
truth ful. These beliefs support a n equilibrium cha racterized by full rev elation. Shin [1994] extend s
this model and analyzes the pricing of a firm's stock wh en a manager is exogenously endowed w it h
information and investors are uncertain about its qua lity. He show s that the responsive ness of the
stock price t o the firm 's disclosure reveals invest ors' beliefs a b out the credibility of that d isclosure .
580nce again interpreting this work in a "ma rket " context, one could suggest that M a tthews and
Postlewaite (1985] assume tha t t h e manager is not ex ogenously informed about t he firm's earning s
prospects , b ut must decide w hether to voluntarily gather inform a t ion tha t will perfectly reveal the
fi rm's earnings. They examine t h e effect on t he m a nage r 's incentives to gather inform a t ion if he
is required to report it. On the other hand , F ishman and H a gerty (1990] consider t he effect of
restricting t he vagueness with which a m a nager may reveal his information. They note tha t limits
on the manager's disc retion may inc rease the amount of information communicated.
59Crawford a nd Sobel [1982] esta blished tha t disclosure may be partia lly informative, prov ided the
manager 's and investor's incentiv es a re not too misaligned. Subsequent work h as further examined
the credibility problem tha t is centr al t o cheap-talk ga mes. For inst ance, Farrell a nd Gibbons
[1989], N ewman and Sansing [1993], a nd G igler (1994] focus on the impact of different u sers (e.g. ,
investors and competitors) on a m a nager ' s incent ives t o dis clos e his information. They show that
the presence of two a udiences w h o r esp ond to the information differently may enh a nce the credibility
of the ma n ager's d isclosure. Nevertheless, with in these single period settings, full revelation of the
m a n ager's information does not occur. In contrast , within a multi-p e riod set t ing, Stocke n (2000]
shows that reputational cons iderations m ay be sufficient t o support full r evelat ion of a m a nager 's
information.
60See Fische r a nd Verrecchia [2000].
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But in reading over the accounting literature, it would appear that the thorniest
problem w ith the early work was its reliance on the assumption that the manager's
objective in exercising discretion in disclosure was to boost the firm's current capitalization level, even in t he event that this practice jeopardized future ret urns. For
example, if there are costs associated w ith disclosing informat ion whose dissemination is not required, and the sole effect of dis closure is to provide an immediate and
ephemeral b oost t o the firm's current market price, perhaps firm shareholders should
contract w ith the manager to never disclose voluntarily. In other words, to w hat ext ent does maximizing current capitalization eschew totally efficiency and/ or agency
problems implicit in voluntary disclosure? 6 1
Throug hout accounting, one often-stated rationale for a manager to be concerned
with the firm's current capitalization level, as opposed to the firm's future value, is
that contracts are incomplete. For example, there may be no way for the manager to
be rewarded on the basis of the future value of t he firm, if for no other reason than
the fact that he may not be around when the future a rrives. In addition, there may
be compelling reasons why current market valuations are important, such as the possibility that the firm intends to is sue additional equity to finance fut ure o perations,
or as currency in stock-swa ps. Yet another interesting rationale to consider is that
maximizing current market capit alization may simply be a heurist ic behavior on the
manager's part. For example, perhaps the manager maximizes current market capi61As pointed out by Dontoh [1989], another problem w ith maximizing current capitalization, as
opposed to future returns, is that it offers no pos sibility for the voluntary disclosure of bad news,
w hich seems inconsistent with the extant empirical literat ure. Of course, one way a round this
problem is to assume that m a nagers voluntarily disclose so as to minimize curre nt firm price, perhaps
in part to ensure positive price reactions to subsequent ma ndated announcements (as well as to
minimize the liability associated with withholding information that negatively impacts current firm
valua tions). See Teoh and Hwang [1991] for a model in which a separating equilibrium exists in
w hich "good n ews" is withheld and "bad news" disclosed.
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talization because he has been conditioned t o believe that he is truly being evaluated
based on this benchmark, regardless of his contract . Anecdotal evidence in support
of this idea is the fact that business media a rt icles about top managers commonly
allu de t o t he level of market capitalization increase or decrease during t hat manager's
tenure w ith the firm.
But in view of t his problem, an alternative model for mot ivating voluntary disclosure is to follow the general outline of the o rigina l story, w hich is based on the notion
of proprietary costs, and then show how t hese proprietary costs arise endogenously
in a duopoly game played between two firms that seek to maximize future returns
(as opposed t o current market value) .62 By couching the disclosure problem in the
context of a duop o ly game played between t w o firms, the decision t o disclose by one
firm assists the oth er firm's production decisions, and/or whether to enter a particular
market for the manufacture of some good in the first place. Because duopoly ga mes
t y pically lead t o qua dratic optimiza t ion problem s , t hey are very facile . Consequently,
it is little wonder that there are a cornucopia of pa pers in the accounting literat ure
that exploit this t echnology t o study discretionary dis closure. 63
Duo poly game papers have two important features.

First, m their voluntary

disclosure decisions, managers can be made to be concerned w ith futur e firm value,
which resolves t he problem of assuming t hat managers seek t o maximize curr ent
value.64 Second, a duop oly setting characterizes well how the release of information
62This is essent ially the centra l feature of papers like Da rrough and Stoughton [1988], Feltham and
Xie [1992], and W agenhofer [1990], among others.
63To cite a few m ore papers, see Feltham, et al. [1992], Darrough [1993], a nd Gigler, et al. [1994).
64Qf course, maximizing future value is not a r equirement of a duopoly game. In the context of
a duopoly gam e ma n ager s can still be concerned exclusively w ith current valu e: see, fo r example,
Hayes and Lundholm [1996), as well as m o del #2 in the subsequent subsect ion. In addition, it is
also possible t hat managers' m otiva tion t o disclose is governed by neither current n or future firm
values. For example, Bushm an and Indjejikian [1995) assume that a manager discloses volunt arily
to boost insider trading profits by reducing the trading aggressiven ess of other priv ately informed
agents .
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creates proprietary cost s en dogenously. While all of this is to t he good, there are
criticisms of t his a pproach. First , it could be arg ued t hat once the nature of t he cost
has been identified (i.e ., t he fa ct that it is proprieta ry), there is little additional ins ight
associat ed with showing how it evolves endogenously. Second, duopoly gam es, per

se, may n ot thwart the "unraveling" of wit hheld information in the a bsence of some
additional modeling feature. The reason for t his is that if two firms compete in the
same (or similar) product market(s), the act of wit hholding inform ation by one firm
may be interpreted by his competitor as information that favors boosting o utput .
Once boosted beyond a certain level by a compet itor, however , output negatively
impacts on t he informed firm's ability to generate revenues in his product m arket,
thereby propelling t he latt er to fully disclose to t he former.
Putting aside t he narrow is sue of which collection of stylized assumptions best
characterizes the discretionary nature of disclosure, a broader crit icism of discret ionary disclosure models in the accounting literat ure in toto should focus on t wo
problems: the result s offered a re highly sensitive to sp ecific modeling assumptions,
and the discretionary disclosure arrangements , per se, are typically inefficient . W ith
regard t o the first issue, the literature documents that results in d uopoly games depend upon w hether: t he competit ion is Cournot (quant ity setting) or Bertra nd (price
setting), the private information is cost or demand information, and whether the decision to disclose is m a de ex post or ex ante. 65 Another ar ea in which results depend
upon model nua nces is in t he relation between volunt ary disclosure a nd com p et it ion. For example, some have m odeled competition in the cont ext of an ent ry game
(i.e., a game in which one firm contemplates prod ucing a good already produced by
some other firm) a nd cla imed that greater competition encour ages m ore d isclosure .
65See specifically Darrough [1993], who does a n excellent job of delineating t he sensitiv ity of these
assumptions on results.
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Alternatively, others have modeled competition in the co ntext of a post-entry game
(i.e., a game in which b oth firms are currently producing) and cla imed that greater
competition inhibits more disclosure. 66 Yet another area of controversy brought on
by seemingly innocuous differences in modeling ass umptions is the relation between
voluntary disclosure and t he ex ante differential informa tio n quality between the manager and t he ma rket. Here, some have cla imed that higher differential information
quality leads to mo re voluntary disclosure while others have cla imed the reverse. 67
With regard to the efficiency of discretionary d isclosure arrangements, it is u seful to introduce the following semantic d istinctions. B y a discretionary disclosure
arrangement, I mea n a sit uation in w hich m a nagers or firms ex ercise discretion w ith
respect to the disclosure of information a b out which they may have knowledge (i.e ., ex

post ). A lternatively, by a precommitment arrangement or mechanism, I mean a situat ion in which managers or firms establish a preferred disclosure p olicy in the absence
of any prior k nowledge of the informat ion (i.e. , ex ante ). My point about efficiency
is that often arrangements in w hich managers are g ranted t he discretion to disclose

ex post are inefficient in compa rison to arrangements in w hich the firm (or managers )
precommit ex ante. For example, t y pically one can show t hat precommitting to a
policy of either no disclosure or full disclosure before t he informat ion arrives, or perhaps electing t o never become informed in the first place, dominat es a lternatives in
w hich the manager exercises discretion a fter r eceiving the informatio n. For example,
some have shown that precommitments to nondisclosure in the Cournotj dem a nd and
Bertrand/ cost cases, a nd precommitments t o full disclosure in t he Cournot/cost and
Bertrand/ demand cases , do minate alternative disclosure arrangements. 68 Similarly,
66For the former see Da rrough and Stoughton [1990] (see also Verrecchia [1990b]), and for t he latter
see Clinch and Verrecchia [1997].
67See Verrecchia [1990a] for the former and P enno [1997] and Dye [1998] for t he reverse.
68See Da rrough [1 993].
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ot hers have show n that it is optimal for the manager t o precommit never to become
informed (or otherwise proscribe this behavior) , lest the m a nager b e t empted t o engage in costly disclosure a ctivit ies ex post. 69 Consequently, if, in the face of all t his ,
a manager cont inues t o exercise discret ion in the d isclosure of information ex post,
there must b e som e u nstat ed, unmod eled , and/or unresolved agency problem or efficiency consideration that lurks in the backgro und. Of course, one commonly stat ed
rationale for why managers are allowed the discretion to disclose ex post is that precommitment mecha nis ms do not exist. And w hile t his rat ionale is ind eed t rue, it has
lit tle t o recommend it on economic g rounds other than exp ediency.
A s in the p revious essay, below I present a series of increasingly m ore sophisticated,
discretionary disclosu re modeling vignettes in an at t empt to illustrate t he evolutio n
of the literature. Specially, in m odel #1 I discu ss how the existence of either a fixed
proprietary cost or uncertainty about the existence of withheld information leads to
equilibr ia in which information is some t imes d isclosed and some t imes wit hheld,
assuming that a firm seeks t o maximize it s current value . In m od el # 2 I relax the
assumpt ion of fixed costs t o allow for endogenous , variable proprietary costs , but
cont inue to assume that a firm seeks t o maximize its current value. The provocativ e
feature of m odel # 2 is that w hile it suggests t hat the optimal d isclosure p olicy ex

post is o ne of full disclosure, it also suggests t h at the o ptimal disclosure policy ex

ante is one of no disclosure; this points out the potent ial inefficiency of d iscretionary
disclosure arrangements. In model # 3, I extend the a nalysis to a duopoly sit uation
in w hich t h e firm a dopts a disclosure policy t o maximize expected profits: t hat is ,
69See Verrecchia [1990a] . See als o P ae [1999], wh o demo nstrates in a clever model of discretionary
d isclosure that in the absence of prohibitions on becoming informed, two ty pes of potential efficiency
losses m ay a rise. F irst , there is t he ( potential) efficiency loss that r esults from a manager acquiring
costly information so as to be able to disclose favorable news at h is discretion. Second , there is the
(pot ential) efficien cy loss t ha t results from the m a nager overinvesting in effort (rela tive t o the first
best level) because doing so reduces informatio n acquisit ion costs.
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the firm maximizes future value and not current value. Here, as well, I p oint out
that there ma y exist ex ante precommitment arrangements that dominate allowing
the firm the d iscretion t o disclose ex post. Finally, in model #4 I extend the duopoly
setting further to one in which there is no requirement that firms disclose truthfully.

Constant Proprietary Costs (Model #1). 7° Consider a firm that produces a
good this period based on demand for the product next period. Next period's d emand
is characterized by a price P, w here P is represented by

P = a + !3Y- x ,
and a, and

/3

are fixed, positive co nsta nts (i.e., a

> 0, and /3 > 0) ,

Y

IS

some

proprietary information about next period's price that is known only to the firm, and

x is the quantity produced by the firm this p eriod. In other words, the firm produces

x this period t o achieve revenue of xP next p eriod. Because realizations of Y are
proprietary, they are onl y known to the market if t hey are disclosed by the firm. In
the absence of disclosure, the market treat s Y as an unknown random variable that
is distributed uniformly between - k and k. For reasons that w ill b ecome clearer
in subsequent extensions of this model, at this stage of t he discussion I want to
limit the interpretation of model

#1 to one in w hich t here is (exclusively) a positive

association between realizations of Y = Y along the continuum between - k and k
and the firm's revenue n ext period, x P. The benefit of a positive association is that
one can interpret increasingly higher realizations of Y

=

Y as increasingly "better

news" because they indicate hig her revenue next period. As I show below, a sufficient
condition to achieve a positive association is to assume that a
assume a ~

/3k in both models #1 and

~

/3k.

Consequently, I

#2, and then relax t his assumpt ion in model

70Jn conjunction with model # 1, see Jovanovic [1982] and Verrecchia [1983].
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# 3.71
Also in models # 1 and # 2, I assume that the firm' s discretionary disclosure policy
is t o maximize the firm's current value (for whatever reason). Because increasingly
higher realizations of Y

=Y

imply increasingly "better new s," the firm is naturally

predisposed toward disclosing high realizations of Y = Y as an ind ication of hig h
revenue next period.

The dilemma fo r the firm is t hat knowledge of Y

= Y

is

proprietary, perhaps b ecause it can be used by ot her, competing firms t o set t heir
production schedules for t he go od, or goods that are close substitutes . Here, I assume
that the proprietary cost associated w ith d isclosing any realization of Y = Y is
c, where c

> 0. N ot e that this implies t hat the proprietary cost associated w it h

disclosing any information is fixed and invariant, independent of the information .
To d etermine w het her the firm discloses its proprietary information, consider its
investment decision w hen Y = Y is disclosed. In this situation the firm produces the
amount x so as t o maximize
max xE[PjY = Y ] = x(a: + (3Y - x) .
Not e that this function is con cave in x and otherwise well behaved. This implies
producing a quantity

1

x = 2(a:

+ (3Y ),

and selling this q uantity for
p

=

Q;

+ (3Y-

1

X =

2(a: + (3Y )

m the next p eriod. Note t hat one consequence of a ssum ing a:

~

(3k is that the

quantity of the good produced this period and the price at which t he good sells next
71As I show below, another fea t ure of assuming a 2 (Jk is that it ensures t hat in this m odel the
quantity of the good produced this period a nd the price a t w hich the good sells next period a re bot h
nonnegative in equilibrium.
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period, i.e., x = P =~(a+ ,BY ), are b ot h nonnegative for allY E [- k, k]. In addition,
regardless of whether the firm discloses or wit hholds Y = Y, its revenue nex t period
(exclusive of any proprietary costs) is x P = ~(a+ ,BY)

2

.

Finally, note that because

d~xP = ~,8 (a + ,BY) ;::: 0 for all Y E [- k, k] w hen a ;::: ,Bk, r ealizations of

Y and

revenue are posit ively associated.
The market values t he firm based on its know ledge of the firm' s revenue next
period (if
W h en Y

Y

= Y is disclosed) or its ex p ectat ion of revenue (if Y = Y is wit hheld) .

=Y

is disclosed, t he market knows that the firm's revenue next p eriod is

(including the proprietary cost)
- -

E [xPIY = Y] =

1

2

"4 (a+ ,BY )

- c.

Alternatively, consider what occurs when Y = Y is not disclosed. Because realizations of Y

= Y

and revenue are p ositively associated, the market conjectures that
-

A

realizations of Y that are withheld must be below some threshold Y that does not
warrant incurring t he proprietary cost c . Consequently, w hen Y = Y is not disclosed,
the market assesses the firm's revenue next period as

E[~(a + ,BY )2 jY = Y

<::: Y ]

1
(3a2 + 3a,B(Y - k ) + ,82 (Y2
12

-

Yk + k 2 ) ).

This implies t hat based on a realization of Y = Y , the difference bet ween disclosing
and wit hholding this information from the market on t he firm's current va lue is

E[xPjY = Y] - c - E[xPjY <::: Y]
± (a + ,8Y)

2

-

c-

1
(3a2 + 3a,B(Y - k ) + ,82 (Y 2
12

-

Yk + k 2 ) ).

Consequently, the firm is m otivated to d isclose Y = Y w hen t his expression is positive
and wit hhold it when t he expression is negative, because t his arrangement maximizes
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the market's expectation of the firm's revenue next p eriod, and hence the firm's current value. That value of Y that leaves the firm indifferent between d isclosing and
withholding is the t hreshold level of disclosure. Specifically, the threshold level Y is

E[xP JY = Y ] - c- E[xPJY : : ; Y ] is nonnegative for all Y ;:::: Y and
negative for allY< Y. One can show that here a unique threshold level of disclosure

defined such t hat

occurs at

In particular, this threshold has the feature that Y
The economic interpretation of Y = - 4~

> - k, provided c > 0.

(3a + f3k -

J9(a - f3k )2 + 96c) is that

it is the level of "news" t hat leaves t he firm indifferent between disclosing Y = Y at
-

a cost c and withholding the realization Y

= Y.

-

Because values of Y

=Y

A

above Y

indicate high demand for the good, the firm is w illing to provide this information to
the market for valuation purposes despite the proprietary costs associated w ith this
-

A

decision. Alternatively, because values of Y = Y below Y indicate average or low
demand for the good, the firm is justified in w ithholding knowledge of Y = Y because
this information does not enhance valuation and its d isclosure entails a proprietary
cost. Note that at c

=

0,

Y=

-k. In other words, in the absence of proprietary

costs, the on ly equilibrium thresh old is one that implies full disclosure. In addition,
as c increases, Y increases. In other words, disclosure thresholds rise as proprietary
costs rise.
To d igress briefly, a variation on this model is to assume that there are no proprietary costs, but, instead, the firm is only known to be informed with probability q
and uninformed with probability 1- q.72 Note that w hen the firm is uninformed, it
produces x = ~a, a nd at that quantity the goods sell for a price P = ~a + f3Y . T his
72See, for example, Dye [1985a] a nd Jung and Kwon [1988].
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implies that E [xPJ=

fcl.

Consequently, here the t hreshold level of disclosure,

Y,

is

determined by finding the Y that solves

E[xPif = YJ - qE[xPp7 ~ YJ - (1 -

q) E[xPJ= 0,

which is equivalent to finding the Y that solves

Note, for example, t hat ifthe firm is known to be informed with certainty (i.e. , q

=

1) ,

then the threshold lev el of disclosure is -k, which implies full disclosure. In other
words, a firm know n to be informed with certainty is tantamount to a firm with no
proprietary costs.
Returning to my original model, while much of the discretionary disclosure literature has focused primarily on threshold levels of disclosure, arguably it is not
threshold levels per se that are of interest, but rather the unconditional probability,
or likelihood, of disclosure. One reason for this is that from an empirical perspective, threshold levels of disclosure are likely unobservable, w hereas the probability of
disclosure is potentially knowable through observations on repeated plays of a discretionary disclosure game. Recall that if Y is a random variable distributed uniformly
between k and -k, then the probability of disclosure is

r

1
max[ k }y dY, OJ
2

max[ 2~ (k - ¥),OJ

max[ 8~k (sf3k + 3a- J 9(a - f3k)2 + 96c) ,OJ.

Note that t h e probability of disclosure is less t han 1 provided that c > 0, and greater
than 0 provided that c is not too large.
Now consider the relation between disclosure a nd information quality.

In our

analysis, note that the manager is assumed to know the determinant of price perfectly
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(i.e., he knows Y), while

a priori the market only knows Y to be uniformly distributed

between k and -k. The variance of a uniformly distributed random variable is !k 2 . In
effect, the variance increases as the support of t h e uniform, k, widens . Consequently,
k can be thought of as a measure of informat ion asymmetry, or ex ante differential
informatio n quality, between the market and the manager. T he higher k, the less the
market knows relative to the manager

a priori.

In this context an interesting question

here is how the thresh old level of d isclosure shifts a s information asymmetry between
the market and the manager g rows. In the model currently under discussion , one
can show t hat t he probability of disclosure generally increases as k increases. 73 This
implies that as information asymmetry between the market and the manager grows,
in equilibrium the m a nager discloses more often. One could a rgue that this result
is eminently sensible: greater d isparity between what the manager knows and what
the market knows exacerbates the adverse-selection problem. Thus, amelioration of
this adverse-selection problem requires more disclosure. The problem is that some
have a rgued t hat models with the opposite prediction are equally sensible. 74 A ll this
points to a fragile relation between assumptions and predictions.
The rationale for t he next model is that proprietary costs may not be constant :
specifically, they may depend upon realizations of Y. For example, higher realizations
of Y may imply greater costs and lower realizations may imply lower costs - or perhaps
the reverse! But in any event , there may be some r elation between information and
the costs of d isclosing that information. To see t he effect of p roprietary costs t hat
vary as a function of the manager's private knowledge, consider the next model.
73If a 2:: 2(3k, then t h e probability of disclosure is always increasing as k increases. If a < 2(3 k, then,
in addition, one n eeds c > a.l..(2(3k - a ): in other words, proprietary costs cannot be insignificant.
74See specifically Penno [199¥J a nd D ye [1998]. Of course, as t he previous footnote suggests, one
can also get this prediction by assuming that proprietary costs are insignificant.
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Endogenous and Variable Proprietary Costs (Model #2). 75 In this variation on the prior model, all previous assumptions are maintained ex cept for the one
concerning a constant proprietary cost. Specifically, here two firms are introduced
w ho compete in a Cournot (quant ity setting) duopoly in which one firm is informed
and t he other uninformed. In effect, each firm invests in the current perio d to produce
some go od, in anticipatio n of t he fact that the good will sell for a price P in a future
period, where Pis represent ed by

P =a + {3Y - x 1
w here a and

/3 are all fixed,

-

Xu ,

positive constants (i.e., a

> 0, and /3 > 0), Y is some pro-

prietary information about the anticipated price that is known only to the informed
firm, and

XI

and xu are the amounts produced by the informed and uninformed firms,

respectively. Each firm's decision to produce is made without know ledge of the other
firm' s decision. Because Y is unknown to either the uninformed firm or the market
that values the future prospects of both firms, I continue to represent it by a random

-

-

variable Y, w h ere Y has a uniform distribution between - k a nd k. Also as b efore,
note that a high value of Y = Y along the continuum between -k and k continues
to be "good new s" because it indicates that the price at which the good will sell will
be high in a future period.
The dilemma faced by the informed firm is that if it discloses "good news," the
uninformed firm will also come to know t his fact and b oost its production accordingly,
thereby negatively impacting on the informed firm's revenue. Consequently, in this
model disclosure of a "good news" value of Y

= Y

entails a proprietary cost that

varies w ith the disclosed information.
75Jn conjunction with model #2, see Hayes and Lundholm [1996].
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To determine w hether and when the informed firm discloses Y
investment decision when Y

=

Y is disclosed. When Y

=

=

Y, consider its

Y is disclosed, let x f and xf]

represent the quantities of the good produced by the infor med and uninformed firms,
respectively. Here, the informed firm produces the quantity xf so a s t o maximize
D

--

D

D

D

max x i E[P IY = Y] = x i (a+ (JY- x i - xu) .
This implies that the informed firm produces an amount
1 (a
XDI = 2

where

+ (} y

' D)
- Xu
'

xB is the informed firm' s conjecture about

t h e uninformed fir m 's production

decision. Similarly, when Y = Y is disclosed, t he uninformed firm produces a quantity

w here

xf

is the un informed firm ' s conj ecture about t he informed fir m 's production

decision. Here, self-fulfilling conjectures on the part of both t he informed firm (about

xf3)

and the uninformed firm (about

xf)

that are self-fulfilling are

xf

=

xB

=

t (a + (JY ), which implies that in equilibrium b oth firms produce the same amount.
In addit ion, here the price at w hich both firms sell their goods is

P

D

D

D

1

=a+ (JY- XI - Xu = 3(a + (JY ),

which implies that the informed firm achieves revenues next period of xf pD = ~ (a+

Now consider the case in which the informed firm does not disclose Y = Y. When

Y=

Y is not disclosed, let x f and x£J represent the quantit ies of t he good produced

by the informed and uninformed firms, respectively. Here the informed firm continues
t o produce a quant ity

xf =% (a+ (JY -
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x£f),

where, once again, i:fJ is the informed firm's conjectu re about the uninformed firm's
production decis ion. Here, the uninformed firm does not observe Y

=

Y. Despite

this fact, being rat ional it conjectures that if Y were above some t h reshold, the
informed firm would disclose Y = Y . As in model #1, the basis for this conjecture
is the presumpt ion that the informed firm seeks to boost its current market value
(for whatever reason), and disclosing high values of Y
by V

E[YIY

=

=

Y ::::;

Y]

=

! (Y -

=

Y achieves this. Define V

k ). In the absence of disclosing

Y

=

Y , the

uninformed firm solves
max x {JE

[Pif = Y::::; f]

N

x u E [a

+ {3Y -

xI - Xu 1Y = Y ::::; Y]
~N

N

-

~

x{f(a + {3V- i:lj- x{f) ,
w here, once again, i:lj is the u n informed firm's conjecture about the informed firm's

-

~

production decision conditional on Y being below some threshold Y. This, in turn,
implies that t he uninformed firm produces an amount

N
Xu

1 (a + {3V- XI
~N) .
=2

Here, conjectures that are self-fulfilling a re i:lj = ~ ( 2a

+ 3{3Y

- {3V) a nd i:fj

t (a + {3V ), which implies t hat the price at which both firms sell their goods is
pN =a + {3Y - xlj - x{f

1

= 6" (2a + 3{3Y- {3V ).

Consequently, h ere the informed firm's revenue next p eriod is xlj p N

=

3~ (2a + 3{3Y

-

N ow define current market value a s the market's valuation of the infor med firm
based on the market's expectation of the revenue likely t o be achieved next per iod.
W h en Y

=Y

is disclosed, t he market's expectation of t he rev enue of the informed
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firm next period is

Alternatively, when Y = Y is not disclosed, the market's expectation of the revenue
of the informed firm next perio d is

E[ 3~ (2a + 3(3Y- (3V) 2 1Y = Y
1
( 4a2 + 4a(3(Y - k ) +
36

recalling that

<::: Y ]

~(3 2 (Y2 -

*Yk + k

2

)) ,

V = t (Y- k) .

To understand at an intuitive level the nature of an equilibrium t o this problem,
note that the difference between the revenue of the informed firm when disclosing
-

A

Y = Y versus not disclosing and establishing a threshold at Y is

E[xf pvw = Y] - E[xf PNW-:::: Y]

1

1(

2

- (a+ (3Y) 2 - - 4a 2 + 4a(3(Y- k) + -72
(3 (Y 2 - -Yk + k 2)
) .
9

36

4

7

Consequently, as in the previous model, the informed firm is motivated t o disclose Y

=

Y when this expression is positive and withhold it when the expression is negative.
One can show that the expression

xf E[FD IY = Y ] - xf E[PNjY

<::: Y ] reduces to

! /3 (Y + k) (16a + 9(3Y- 7{3k) and, consequently, there exists a threshold level of

1 4

disclosure at Y

= 9~ (7{3k - 16a).

disclosure, namely, Y =

1(7(3k -

That is, t here exists a unique threshold level of

16a), which has t he feature that the informed firm

9

discloses w henever Y ;:::: Y = 9~ (7{3k - 16a) and withholds otherwise. In ad dit ion,
this threshold implies that the proba bility of disclosure is

-

1 ~k

2k y

dx

= -

1

2k

A

(k - Y)

1
(8a
9{3k

= -

+ {3k) .

This all sounds good, but consider t he following. When a ;:::: {3k, the threshold
level of disclosure is at the lowest realization of Y and t he probability of disclosure
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1s always 1.

That is, a ~ (3k implies that

probability of disclosure is 9~ (8a

+ (3k)

Y

~ 1.

=

9~ (7(3k -

16a) ::; -k and the

In other words, in an attempt to

ensure a positive association between realizations of Y and revenue next period, our
assumptions have led us unwittingly to a model of full disclosure! 76 Why is it the case
that att empts on the part of t he informed firm to withhold proprietary information
"unravel" here, but not in the previous model (i.e., model # 1)? Because realizations
of Y and expected revenue next period are positively related, b oth the market and the
uninformed firm int erpret w ithheld information as unambigu ously "bad news," just
as they would have in model # 1. Unlike model #1, however, here there is no fixed,
or constant, proprietary cost to act as a discontinuity in the valuation of the informed
firm depending upon whether t he information is disclosed or w ithheld. (In addit ion,
there is no uncertainty as to the existence of the withheld information.) Consequently,
here, information is always disclosed to the market, despite its proprietary nature.
But the provocative feature of model #2 is that while it suggests that the inevitable disclosure policy ex post is one of full disclosure, it also suggests that the
preferred disclosure policy ex ante is one of no disclosure. For example, from the discussion above we know that on the basis of establishing a threshold level of disclosure

Y, the informed firm's expected revenue before Y is known or observed (i.e.,

ex ante)

lS

Y] iY > Y] + E[E[xf _?N!Y ::; YJIY ::; Y]

~

fk

~ (a + (3Y) 2 dY

2k }y- 9

76To see tha t there is indeed a pos itive association, note that w hen a: 2: {3k and the t hreshold
level of disclosure implies full disclosure (i.e., Y = -k), then d~
P 0 = ~{3 (a:+ {3Y) 2: 0 and

d~ x~ pN

=

f;f3 (za: + 3{3Y - ~{3 (fr - k)) = f;f3 (2a: + 3{3Y + {3k)

xP

2:0 for allY E [- k ,

k]. Thus, as

in model #1, high realizations of Y = Y can be interpreted unambiguously a s "good new s" because
they indicate high revenue next period.
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Next, note that the derivative of this function with respect to

Y

is

This result implies t hat expected revenue is unambiguously increasing as the informed
firm increases its threshold level of disclosure,

Y.

In effect, expected revenue and

shareholders' welfare are maximized w hen the firm precommits to a p olicy of no
disclosure (or, alternatively, prohibits the ma nager from becoming informed in the
first place) .77 In short, the (inevitable) ex post policy of full disclosure is in obvious
conflict with the preferred ex ante policy of no disclosure.
The fact t hat this model suggests an ex post p olicy of full disclosure, despit e
the apparent inefficiency of this arrangement ex ante, leav es open the question as
to w hether there exists either some unstated or unmodeled benefit to exercising disclosure with some discretion. But a full discussion of this is left for the next essay.
Before we get there, in our next volunt ary disclosure model we need to address a nother
concern. Both models # 1 a nd #2 were premised on the assumption that ma nagers
and / or firms were concerned exclusively w ith the market's current valuation of the
firm. As discussed previously, t his assumption is controversial. How ca n we expand
these models to restrict the concerns of firms and/ or managers to the expected (or
future or liquidating) value of the fir m ?

Maximizing Expected Firm Value (Model #3). 78

To incorporate opti-

77This result should be equa lly obv ious in the context of a model with constant propriet a ry costs
(e.g., model #1). For example, with constant proprietary costs, the only effect of disclosure is to
reduce ex pected net revenues by c. See, for exam ple, corollary 5 of Verrecchia [1990a] .
78Jn conjunction with model #3, see Clinch and Verrecchia [1997].
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mization over a firm's ex p ected value, consider the following alternative char acterization of price. Now I assume that t here are t wo info rmed firms, the first of which
sells its goods in a p rod uct market in w hich demand is character ized by a price

P, = a

+ (JY

- x, - ! Xz , and the second of which sells its goods in a product mar-

ket in w hich demand is characterized by P2 =

a+ (JY - 1 x 1 - Xz, where 1 can be

thought t o r epresent either the degree to which the products are subst itutes or the
competitiveness between the t wo product markets. For ex ample , here 1 = 0 indicates
no compet ition between the two firms (i.e ., each firm ha s a monopo ly on the good
that it produces), w hile 1 = 1 indicates that both firms produce identical goods. Set

Y

= fh + f)z. H ere I assume that the first fir m observes (exclusively) fh = Yl, w hile

the second firm obs erves (exclusively )

Y2 = yz, w here f/1 a nd f/2

are both d ist ributed

uniformly between -k and k. Unlike before, however, I make no assumption about
the relation a m ong a, {3, and k .
As before, each firm faces a sequence of two decisions: w hether to disclose its
informatio n con cerning that elem ent of total demand (i.e., Y ) known t o it (i.e ., Yl in
the case of the first firm and Y2 in the case of the second), and, subsequently, w hat
quantity of output to produce (i.e .,

x,

and Xz). A s is st a nda rd in a Cournot setting,

I assum e t hat each firm chooses its optimal qua nt ity based on its own infor m ation
p lus the information voluntarily supplied by, perhaps, its competitor. In a ddition, I
assume that each firm chooses an equilibrium reporting strategy based on rational
inferences about w ithheld informatio n . U nlike m odels # 1 and #2, however, here
I assume t hat each firm chooses the quantity t hat it produces solely to ma ximize
expected revenue, a nd not current value. In other words, here market expectat ions
of current value play no role .
A lso in contrast w ith models #1 and #2, here I allow for negative pnces and
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negative quantities: that is, all of P1 , Pz, x 1, and xz can assume any values along the
real line. The existence of negative prices and quantit ies requires special interpretation, and is not benign in the nat ure of the disclosure equilibrium I describe below.
In effect, if P1 > 0, then firm 1 can produce a positive quantity x1 > 0 for positive
revenue of x1P1
quantity

X1

> 0. Alternat ively, if

P1

< 0 for positive revenue of

< 0, then firm 1 can produce a negative

x 1P1

> 0 . One wa y to interpret negative

quantities that lead to positive revenue is that they chara cterize circumstances in
which a firm is paid a fee for storing , or w ithdrawing from t he market, a good w ith
socially u ndesirable features (e.g., surplus grain, radioactive waste materials, etc.) .
One consequence of negative prices a nd negative quant ities is t hat , unlike model #2,
the equilibrium does not unravel. Specifically, in this model one can show that a
unique equilibrium exists in which firm i discloses Yi when it is in the interval

where Yi solves

and withholds Yi otherwise. Not e that a necessary condition for the existence of
such an interval is that 0 <

Yi < 4 13~ .

In other words, any potential equilibrium

disclosure policy must involve disclosing realizations of Yi that form an int erval that
straddles 0, the unconditional expected value of

Yi.

St ated somewhat differently,

a (potential) disclosure equilibrium consist s of withholding "dra matic news" (i.e.,
realizations of Yi in the tails of their distribution) and disclosing "anticipated news"
(i.e., realizations of Yi surrounding its uncondit ional mean) . To understand this result,
not e that firm i is indifferent between disclosure and no n-disclosure when Yi = Yi
because j 's expectations remain unchanged whether Yi is disclosed or not. Now if
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firm i observes Yi > f)i and does not disclose, firm j w ill set its production levels based
on it expectations (i.e., f); ), whereas i will know that demand is greater and hence be
able to exploit underproduction by its rival. This explains w hy i hides realizat ions of

Yi greater

than f);. In contrast, as realizations move below f);, firm i initially suffers

from non-disclosure for exactly the opposite reason: that is , firm j sets production too
high relative to i's knowledge of demand conditions, pushing prices down for both
firms. This results in firm i disclosing realizations of Yi immediately below f); . But , as
realizations get further below f};, firm i also reacts by reducing its production levels;
this dissipates the relative negative impact of non-disclosure. Furthermore, w hen
realizations of y; are sufficiently below

Yi,

firm i benefits from j 's overproduction:

in effect, i benefits from j's inclination to overproduce at a time of low demand
because i can earn positive revenue by choosing a negative quantity

X;

in conjunctio n

with a negative price. As a result, firm i w ithholds Yi values substantially below j's
expectations.
To digress briefly, one appealing notion of this m odel is that it promulgates the
notion of a ''U-shaped" disclosure region: informat ion in the tails is withheld w hile
"ant icipated new s" is disclosed. Prima facie, as a characterization of discretionary
disclosure in real institutional settings, this has some appeal.

More importantly,

with this model we can address the relation between disclosure and competition.
Specifically, one can show that both the size of the disclosure region and the (ex

ante) probability of disclosure decrease as the degree of competition, as manifest in
[, increases.79 In other words, at least in this model, m ore competition implies less
disclosure. But remember t hat as appealing as these features may be, nonetheless
they are artifacts of a particular model. Features cont rary to these a re just as likely
79See, for example, corollary 1 of Clinch and Verrecchia [1997].
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to occur in models with different, but equally appealing, assumptions.
Furthermore, regardless of how we feel about this particular model, note that it is
still the case that there exist ex ante precommitment arrangements (i.e., arrangements
before the information arrives) that dominate allowing the managers and/ or t he firm
the discretion to disclose ex post (i.e., after Yi and Yj are observed). Fo r example, if
competition between the two firms is not severe, both firms do better by precommitting to a policy of full disclosure in advance of receiving their information. 80 In other
words, despite the advantages of mo del # 3 over the two prior models a s a characterization of discretionary disclosure, it does not reconcile completely discretionary
disclosure arrangements with ex ante disclosure choices.
Before concluding this essay, it is useful to explore the role of one, final a ssumption
maintained throughout models #1-3: if the manager and/or firm chooses to disseminate his private information, he does so truthfully. As alluded t o in the survey of
prior research on disclosure, there has been some attempt in the literat ures of b oth
accounting and economics to understand the implicatio ns of relaxing this assumption.
These attempts fall under the broad auspices of "cheap-talk" games.

Disclosure in "Cheap-Talk" Settings (Model #4). 81 Consider a duopolistic setting where one firm observes some proprietary, non-verifiable information Y
about the next period's price of a product that it produces, but its competitor does
not. Assume that Y is a realization of a random variable Y distributed uniformly
between 0 and 1. The informed firm wishes to send a message, m, w here m is some
element on the real line, about Y to its competitor so that t hey can coordinate better their production levels. Despite an intent t o coordinate production lev els, I also
SOBy not "too severe," I mean specifically 1 < 2 (viz - 1): see corollary 2 of Clinch and Verrecchia
[1997].
81ln conjunction with model #4, see Crawford and Sobel [1982].
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assume that b ecause of some element of (unmodeled) competition between the firms,
firms' interests are mis alig ned. Specifically, the informed firm chooses m t o maximize
- (y-

(f + b))

2
,

whereas the co mpetit or chooses yto maximize- ( y-

Y)

2
,

where

y denotes t he uninformed firm' s expectation of Y given the informed firm's message

m, a nd an exogenous parameter b (b -1- 0) reflects the extent t o which firms ' interests
are a ligned. 82 In cont rast to prior m odels , t he salient feature of this game is t h at
the messa ge chosen by the info rmed firm, in the sense of a m essage m , and how the
uninformed compet itor chooses to implement this message, in the sense of choosing
a y, are wholly endogenous: this is w hat is meant by t he expression "cheap-talk." In
ot her words, there is no requirement that the informed firm truthfully report; similarly, t here is no requirement that an uninformed competitor accept t he informed
firm's messa ge at face value (i.e., as a truthful disclosure).
As it happens, all equilibria in this communication game are part ition equilibria.
That is, in a partition equilibrium t he informed firm partit ions t he support of the
private information

Y=Y

into N element s, { ao (N )

=

0, ... ,a; (N), ... ,aN (N)

=

1 },

where 1 :::; N:::; N (b), and sends a message revealing the int erval containing Y = Y,
say a message claiming that Y E (a; (N ) , ai +1 (N)). The firm does not communicate,
however, it s full knowledge of the realization of Y = Y. The uninformed firm, upon
receiving this (noisy) message, int erprets this m essage (correctly) as suggesting that
the conditional expectation of Y is Y =

a;(N ) +;'+ 1 (N) .

In other words, on the one

hand the info rmed firm sends a message that is "t ruthful" in t he sense that it does
not misrepresent the interval in which Y lies, but t he message is noneth eless ''vague."
On the other hand, the uninformed firm chooses to interpret the messa ge "correctly"
82The informed firm (perfectly) observes Y = Y in this setting. Fisc~er and Stocken [2000] consider
a setting where the informed firm has imperfect infor':?ation about Y = Y. They establish t hat the
quality of the uninformed firm 's information a bout Y = Y is maximized when the informed firm
has coarse or im perfect informat ion.
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in that the conditional expectation of Y is indeed
distributed in the interval (a i ( N ) , ai + 1 ( N)) ).

a;(N )+;;+ , (N)

when Y is uniformly

Note the role misaligned inter ests

play in determining equilibria. T he maximum amount of informat ion that can be
communicated potentially in equilibrium, measured using the residual variance of Y
that the uninformed firm expects a fter hearing the equilibrium m essage, decreases
as the misalignment of the competing firms' incentives, b, increases . For example,
w hen b = 0 there is no misalignment a nd full revelation results (in equilibrium) .
Alt ernatively, w hen b

-----t

oo, misalignment is total and there is no possibility of

communicating a ny information between the informed and uninfo rmed.
In the context of t he discussion above, the interesting feat ure of a "cheap-talk"
equilibr ium is that despite the fact that t he informed firm's disclosure is non-verifiable
and without cost, t he informed firm sends a message, albeit noisy, t o the uninformed
firm for all realizat ions of Y . T his result differs from the equilibria characterized for
models #1-3 where for som e realizations of Y dis closu re occurs, whereas for others it
does not. In short, a "cheap-talk" equilibrium comports nicely with the notion that
in pr actice managers and/or firms comment on everything, but in a fashion w hereby
proprietary information is always disclosed w ith some element of vagueness .

Summary.

While I have allud ed t o many d eficiencies in t he co ntext of the

discretio nary-based disclosure literature, t he provocative feature of t his literature
is that it has cha nged t he wa y researchers in accounting think about disclosure, w hile
at the same t ime offering conclusions that seem immediate. The main conclusion is
particularly compelling : in t he presence of costs and/or uncertainty, broadly defined,
managers will elect t o disclose or wit hhold informatio n about firm value despite the
fact that agents outside t he firm interpret withheld information ratio nally. In other
words, this literature tells a compelling economic story a b out the incentives on the
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part of the manager or firm to disclose voluntarily. This strength seems t o overcome
weaknesses that include: a reliance on the assumptions in some models that ma nagers
seek to maximize current market value (as opposed to future value) and truthfully
report; the fact that results in the literature are hig hly sensitive to assumptions; and
that discretionary disclosure strategies, per se, are typically inefficient in that the firm
does better by precommitting never to disclose. But having alluded to the potential
inefficiency of discretio nary-based disclosure models, let me use this as a segue t o the
next essay.

4

Efficiency-Based Disclosure

What disclosure arrangements or strategies are preferred unconditionally: t hat is,
without prior knowledge of the information?

As has been discussed previously,

association-based research is premised on the notion that disclosure is exogenous.
Discretionary-based research posits endogenous disclosure arrangements, but with no
requirement that they be preferred ex ante. Therefore, having discussed those t wo
topics in some detail, this is an opportune time to ask whether there exist disclosure
arrangements that would also have this feature. In the context of this discussion, I
refer t o such arrangement s a s "efficient" : that is, efficient disclosure arrangements
are those that are preferred unconditionally.

Notions of efficiency are central to

economics. Therefore, if one objective of the disclosure literature is to forge a link
between financial reporting and economics, failure to integrate efficiency into the
discussion may be a fatal oversight.
This is not to suggest that discussions of t he relation b etween disclosure and
efficiency have never entered the domain of accounting research. Arguably, the earliest theory -based, economic analyses of disclosure in capital markets concerned how
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disclosure affected a n eco nom y's social welfare in pure excha nge economies. 83 In particular, early work examined t he extent t o w hich (unconditional) disclosure choice
achieved (weak) Pareto improvements in markets of p erfect competition and p ure
exchange: that is, circumstances in w h ich the disclosure yielded no productive benefits on its own account . T h is early literature, and m u ch of the controversy this
work engendered, has been discussed previously. 84 Nonetheless, it is useful t o review
b riefly some of t he themes in this early literature as a s eg ue into m ore cont emporary
thought.
Pareto improvement is a very strong welfare criterio n in a pu re exchange economy
setting. In the context of disclosure and even in its w eakest form (i.e. , weak Pareto
improvement), it requires that disclosure make n o investor agent w ho participates in
t he m arket worse off even in the event that other market participants unambig uously
benefit. From t he very start, P a ret o improvement, pure exchange, and disclosure
seemed incompatible. One reason for this is t hat disclosure b enefits t he less w ell
informed at t he ex p ense of the b etter informed. But a noth er, and perhaps more
subtle, reason is that the assumption of perfect competition in com b ination w ith
pure exchange leav es little o pport unity for disclosure to yield a benefit.
To understand this last point, recall from t he first essay t hat perfect com p et it ion assumes that each investor agent behaves as if his or her actio ns or behav iors
have no effect on price, and in equilibrium t his co njecture is true. P erfect competit ia n is achieved typically by assuming that the number of investor agent s is la rge
(say, count a bly infinite) . T his ensures that while prices reflect the com bined deci83See , for example, the trio of papers Ng [1975, 1977] and Hakannson , et al. [1982] . Note that while
these papers were published in finance journals, the a uthors themselves held account ing faculty appointments at the tim e of their publication, and h en ce these papers a re representative of accounting
thought a t that time. This is also true of the Kunkel [1982] , a pa p er cited in a subsequent footnote.
84See Verr ecchia [1982b].
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sions of all market participants at an aggregate level, the actions of each individual
agent have no effect on price because of his or her atomistic feature. B y all accounts
perfect competition is a reasonable assumption about markets that are deep and/or
assets that are widely traded. Its role in welfare analyses, however, is not benign.
When markets a re p erfectly competitive, disclosure's primary effect is t o redistribute wealth among market participants. For example, consider the consequences of a
"good news" disclosure concerning the value of an asset. A "good news" disclosure
makes individuals w ho are overweighted in that asset bet ter off and individua ls who
are underweighted in that a sset wors e off (where the notions of overweight and underweight are relative to some norm , such as t heir per-capita share of the risky asset
absent different beliefs or ex p ectations about the asset's uncertain value). Similarly,
"bad n ews" disclosures do the reverse. Thus, to t he extent to which markets are
populated by agents w ho are risk-averse, a consequence of an anticipated disclosure
is that it makes market participants collectively worse off (in expectation). This is
referred to as the adverse risk -sharing effect of increased disclosure. Of course, in complete markets where all anticipated events can be contracted ov er through trading in
advance of the events, effectively market participants can insure themselves against
adverse risk-sharing consequences. But this would only ensure t hat disclosure has no
ben eficial role in markets t hat are complete, in conjunction w ith a debilitating role
in market s that a re less than p erfectly complet e. Consequently, these results inclined
much early research to conclude that the benefits of disclosure were at b est illusive,
and at worst harmful. 8 5
It should come as no surpnse to suggest that researchers were less than fully
85See, for example, the discussions in Hirshleifer [197 1] a nd Marshall [1974]. For example, Marsha ll

[1974, p.380] states: "If the impact of information is insured before its arriva l, that ins urance
precludes further trade based on the news .. .ln the contrary case when the news must arrive before
its impact is insured in a preliminary market, the information is harmful."
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satisfied with this conclusion, and interest in a welfare role for disclosure remained
keen. At this juncture, however, the literature seems t o have bifurcated dow n t wo
distinct paths . The first path was t o su ggest t hat the problem lay w ith the maintained
assumptio n of a p ure exchange econom y. That is, if o ne allowed for production and
exchange, t h ere existed conditions un der w hich disclosure would be preferred because
altered productio n plans lead to more efficient allocation of reso urces a cross time and
firms.86

In effect, this research path suggested sufficient condit ions for disclosure

t o yield P a reto improvements when employed in conjunction w it h production. The
second pat h was to s uggest that the problem lay with t he maintained a ssumptio n
of costless private informat ion acquisition.

That is, a welfare role fo r disclosure

could be posit ed in an exclusively pure exchange econom y by suggesting that one
pot ential benefit fro m costless public disclosure is that it may preclude costly private
informatio n a cquis it io n. 87 In effect, t his research path explored wh et her, by reducing
or eliminating incentives t o b ecome privately informed at some cost, costless public
disclosure made investors bet ter off d es pite adverse risk-s haring effects.
The t wo papers most representative of these two research paths were published
in the same (very prominent) journal within a few years of one a nother. 88 D espit e
this, the one that su ggest ed that the problem lay wit h t he m a intained a ssumptio n
of pure excha nge seems to have fallen into obscurity, w hereas the o ne that suggest ed
that the problem lay w ith the m aintained assumption of costless p rivat e infor mation
acquisition spawned considerable interest, especia lly a m ong accounting r esearchers. 89
W hy ? If I were permitted t o speculate (and here I am truly speculat ing and not
86See Kunkel [1982].
87See , Verrecchia [1982b; specificaly, pp . 29-37] and Diamond [1985].
88Kunkel [1982] and Diamond [1985], respectively: b oth were published in the Journal of Finance.
89Wo rk in ac=unting inspired by Diamond's [1985] pa per includes Bushman [1991], Indjejikia n
[1991], Lundholm [1991], and Alles and Lundholm [1993]. To give some indication of how quickly
Kunkel's work fell into obscurity, note that Dia mond [1985] does not even cite Kunkel [1982], despite
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offering a critique of the papers), my explanation would be that researchers had
long recognized that production militates against all potential debilitating effects of
disclosure, including adverse risk sharing. 9

° Consequently, the path that promoted

disclosure as a device to yield social value in production and exchange economies
was deemed insufficiently provocative. Alternatively, paths that promoted a utility
for disclosure in (exclusively) pure exchange s ettings remained p opular because they
appeared to be addressing the "disclosure paradox": that is, explaining w hy it was not
the case that more dis closure was bad, and not good. 91 Consequently, this remained
the primary focus of research endeavors in accounting.92
Despite the popularity of work that pro moted disclosure as a device to thwart the
acquisition of costly private information, the research itself was not immune from criticism. Subsequent work questioned whether it actually solved the "paradox." Let me
mention three concerns. First, if one makes market agents (e.g., investors, shareholders, etc.) sufficiently diverse, it is difficult, if not impossible, for disclosure to yield a
positive benefit for everyone. Consequently, the results of this path only seem to have
applied to settings in which investor a gents were fairly homogeneous. For example,
an important paper in this literature shows that better informed shareholders in a
firm always prefer less firm disclosure than less well-informed shareholders .93 This is
due to heterogeneity in the adverse risk-sharing and beneficial cost-saving effects of
the fact that Diamond's work is in the same journal a nd published only three years later.
90For example, more than a decade before Kunkel [1982], Hirshleifer [1971, p .567] had emphasized
this point: " P u blic info rmation ... is indeed of soci al v alu e in a regime of p roducti on and exchange,"
[original emphasis].
91For example, Marshall [1974, p. 382] states: "The argument has been that public information
is valueless and private information valuable, leading to inefficient allocation of resources by overspending on information. This might imply a policy of suppressing these kinds of information... the
logic is compelling ... but it seems a paradox that more information should be bad instead of good ... "
[emphasis added].
920noe again, see Bushman [1991], Indjejikian [1991], Lundholm [1991], and Alles and Lundholm
[1993].
93See Kim [1993].
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disclosure among shareholders with different risk tolerances and different information
acquisition cost functions. 94 Second, one technical feature common to all the papers
in this area is that they are single-period models. That is, the decision to publicly
disclose is made in conjunction with the decision to acquire private information, the
decision to rebalance one's portfolio, etc. As alluded to in the first essay, assessing the
effects of disclosure in the context of a single period model of trade risks commingling
a host of factors that may o bfuscate or obscure disclosure's role. 95 Third, this work
ignores the possibility that when public disclosure is costly and firms compete for
shareholders' attention, firms may actually have an incentive to disclose too much
informatio n: that is , more than the socially optimal amount. 96

The Information Asymmetry Component of the Cost of Capital. Allow
me to summarize the discussion to this point. What started out originally as a literature that sought normative prescriptions for Pareto improvements among all investor
agents who participate in the economy metamorphosed into one of individual firms
making disclosure choices t o maximize t he expected utilit ies of exclus ively their own
shareholders. It remained the case, however, that the focus of the efficiency literature
continued to be on markets that were perfectly competitive. Allowing for the fact that
changing the maintained assumption from one of pure exchange t o one of production
and exchange may yield efficiency gains that offer a rationale for disclosure, for the
remainder of this essay I explore an alternative way t o link disclosure to efficiency.
Specifically, I explore what happens when one changes the maintained assumption
94Jn effect, Kim (1993] shows t hat the results in Verrecchia (1982b] and Diamond's (1985] rely
critically on investors having homogeneous economic features. Indjejikian (1991, p.294] acknowledges
the role of homogeneity in his work: he states, "The high degree of investor homogeneity is an
unfortunate limitation of this [i.e., his] study."
95See specifically my discussion of the motivat ion for model #4 in the first essay. This limita tion
was widely acknowledged: see, e.g., Bushman [1991]. Nonetheless, some papers, e.g., Alles and
Lundholm (1993], also discuss why they do not believe it to be a fatal flaw .
96See, for example, Fishman a nd Hagerty (1989].
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from one of p erfect com p etition to one of imperfect co m p et ition.
In primary capital markets, equit y sha res of a firm are sold t o invest ors t o r aise
cash proceeds for investment . One disclosure-related cost t hat inhibits investment and
hence makes firm equit y sales mo re costly is a t ransaction cost t hat arises from the
adverse-selection problem inherent in t he excha n ge of assets a mo ng investor agent s
of vary ing degrees of informed ness.

I refer to this t ransaction cost as t he "infor-

mation a symmetry com p onent of the cost of capital." The informat ion a symmetry
component of t he cost of capital is the discount t hat firms p rov ide as a means of
accommodating the adverse-selection problem. As such, it does not manifest it self
in p erfectly compet itive m arkets because t here is no ad verse-selection: the purchase
a nd sale of firm eq uit ies by individual, invest or a gent s has no effect on price. In
other words, p erfect competit io n ensures t hat a well info rmed investor will b e a ble
t o ex change a ssets with a less well informed a gent, w ithout being pena lized in a ny
way by the fa ct t h at, on average, the former will always profit at the expense of the
latter. Alt ernatively, in mod els of im p erfect competition , t h e actions or b ehaviors of
each investor are assumed t o b e sufficiently substantive in relation to t he m a rket as
a whole a s t o guarant ee that t hese actions w ill have a n effect on the price at which
trades a re execut ed . In short, the salient feat ure of imperfect competition is that a ll
invest or agents may be required t o pay or offer som e "liquidit y premi um" when assets
are exchanged, so as to protect t hose on the other s ide of the transaction against the
ad verse-selection p rob lem inherent in the ex change of assets amon g different a gent s
wit h va r ying degrees of inform edness . A ll a gents pay or offer t he liq uidity premium
b eca use it is assumed that market ''ty pe" (i.e., the extent of an agent's informed ness) is unknown or u nob servable. In effect, a liquidity premium is a tra nsaction cost
a bso rbed by all agent -ty pes, independent of how well or p oorly informed each is in
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relation t o the market as a w h ole.

If investors hold their sha res u ntil the firm liquidated, t hey should be unconcerned
ab out how transaction costs that arise from the exchange of asset shares prior to liq uidation w ill affect their proceeds . If, however, investors anticipate that they may
sell some s hares prior to liquidation, or buy addit ional shares (through, say, dividend
reinvestment programs or otherwise), then they sho uld factor these transactio n costs
into what t h ey a re willing to pay to hold s hares init ially. The higher the anticipated
transaction costs , the less investors will pay initially, and hence the lower the proceeds a firm receives for investment and pro duction when shares of the firm were sold
in a primary capital market. Consequently, in t he interests of efficiency it is t o the
firm' s advantage to reduce inform at ion asymmetry so as to reduce the infor mation
asymmetry component of the cost of capital. One way t o achieve informat ion asymmetry reduction is for the firm to commit to the highest level of public disclosure
at the t ime shares in the firm are first offered. Specifically, the firm could commit
t o preparing its financial statements using : t he m ost tra nspar ent set of acco unting
standards (e.g ., a multi-national firm electing the standards of the International Accounting St andards Committee versus some less transparent alt ernative) ; the most
transparent procedures w ithin a particular set of sta ndards (e.g., purchase versus
pooling, capital leases versus op erating lea ses); or listing on exchanges that attract
the g reat est a na lyst or investor following (e.g ., the New York Stock Exchange versus
the American Stock Exchange) .

A Modeling Vignette on Disclosure and the Cost of Capital. 97 To summarize the discussion so far, m y proposal for linking disclosur e to efficiency is t hroug h
the information asymmetry component of t he cost of capital. But what exactly does
97Jn conjunction with this v ign ette, see Dia mond and Verrecchia [1991] and Baiman and Verrecchia
[1996].
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one mean by the expression "informatio n asymmet ry component of t he cost of capital" ? What I mean by this expression is t he factor by w hich investors discount
firm equity offerings in anticipation of t ransactio n costs t hat may arise from a dverse
selection; t hese are tra nsaction cost s tha t o riginal, equity-holder investors must b ea r
in the event t hat they liq uidate their equit y h oldings at som e future d ate. T he factor
by w hich investors discount fir m equity offerings t o accommodat e these tra nsa ctions
costs makes investment by t he firm more costly. While I believe that m y ex pla nation
of the "informat ion asymmet ry component of the cost of capit al" is cogent, by the
sa me t o ken I am aware of t he fact t hat this is a term t hat lends itself t o disparat e
int erpret ations. Consequent ly, the purpose of t he follow ing vignet te is t o illustrat e
this concept in a n example t hat retains some of t he same spirit a nd flavor of vignettes
from previous essays.
Of course, if a firm b enefits from a commitment t o greater d isclosure through the
red u ction in its cost of capit al, then w hy would t here be an inform at ion asymm etry
cost component ? In other words, what would pr eclude a firm from choosing t he corner solution of full disclosure, thereby eliminating any pot ential cost? P r esuma bly,
managers and/o r firms do not choose the full-disclosure co rner solution b ecause there
are costs t hat counterva il against t hat choice. In t he lit erature, exa m ples of countervailing economic forces that lead t o interio r d isclosure ch oices (i.e ., less t h an full
disclosure) include risk sharing a nd agency costs.98 Inter estingly, however , nowh ere
in the literat ure can one find a d iscussion predicat ed on w hat is perha ps the m ost
obvious dev ice to ensure an int erior solution: prop riet a ry costs. Conseq uently, a n
ancillary purpose of this exa m ple is t o show how prop rietary costs work in this con98See Dia mond and Verrecchia [1991] fo r the former and Ba iman and Verrecchia [1996] for t he la t t er.
O f course, in the absence of any cou ntervailing force, nothing precludes full disclosure from becoming
the corner solution. See, for exa mple, Bushman, et al. [1996] (see also Verrecchia [1996a]). The
issue of corner solutions is also discussed in Verrecchia [1999].
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text. In short, the motivation for t he following vignette is to illustrate the concept
of the info rmation a symmetry component of t he cost of capital and to show how the
ex istence of proprietary costs may lead to a disclosure p olicy in the interior (that is,
disclose in some circumst ances, and withhold in others ).
Cons ider an entrepreneur w ho owns t he process to sell a good in a market in
w hich t here is another competit or. To initiat e the manufactur ing process, however,
in the first period t he entrepreneur needs to raise C dollars of capit al. To ra ise the
capital, t he entrepreneur offers to sell a percentage Q of the firm to a risk-neutral
investor. The entrepreneur's objective is t o maximize his r eturn from ow ning part
of the firm's revenue generating activities after selling Q percent of the firm t o the
investor in exchange for C dollars of capital. I int erpret that part of the firm's revenue
generating activ ities t hat the entrepreneur sells off as his cost of capital.
To begin , I reintroduce the Cournot duopoly product market game discussed in
model # 3 in the previou s essay (wit h perfect compet itio n , i.e ., 1 = 1 ) . E ach firm
invests in the current period in producing some good , in a nt icip ation of the fact that
the good will sell for a price P in a future period (say, the s econd period), w here P
is represented by

P = a
w here a and

+ {3Y -

f3 are fixed , positive const a nts, Y

Xe -

X0

,

is some proprieta ry informat ion ab out

the anticipated price that is known only to the entrepreneur, a nd

Xe

and

X0

are

the amounts produced by t he ent repreneu r's firm and t he other firm, resp ectively.
Each firm makes a decision as to what to produce without knowledge of the a mount
the other firm produces. Also a s b efore I represent Y as a random variable that

IS

uniformly distributed b etween - k and k .
A factor that affects a n investor's decision to invest w ith the entrepreneur is t hat
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she anticipat es a liquidity shock with probability t in t he second period t o either
purchase or sell one share of the firm. After the C dollars of init ial capital are raised,
purchases or sales of sha res in the entrepreneur's firm t a ke place in a secondary
market. The secondary market is populated by eq ual numbers of informed t raders
w ho also know Y = Y and uninformed , or liq uid ity traders, who have no knowledge
of Y = Y unless t his information is dis closed by the entrepr eneur. A nd in all cases,
trading is restricted to buying or selling one share in t he firm.
Trades for firm shares in the secondary ma rket a re executed by a large number of
market makers, each of w hom has the responsibility of executing one demand order
(to buy or sell one share) in t he second period. Market makers also do not know

! a market ma ker
ex ecutes a n informed trader's demand ord er, and w ith probability ! he execut es an

Y

= Y unless it is disclosed, a nd I assume that with probability

uninformed demand order. Consequently, m arket m akers charge a fee to ensure that
t hey b reak even in executing t rades . This fee can be interpreted as t he "liquidity
premium" charged for executing trades in the presence of adverse selection.
To reduce t his liquidity premium a nd make investment in his firm potentially
more attractive, in the first period t he ent repreneur commits to disclosing Y =Yin
the second p eriod if Y = Y E [- q, q] and w ithholding it if Y = Y E [- k, -q] U [q, k ].
At an intuitive level, one can t hink of t he entrepreneur's commitment as a decision
t o disclose "anticipat ed new s" (i.e ., - q :::; Y :::; q) but to wit hhold "dra m atic news,"
that is, realizations of

Y

in the tails of its distributio n. 99 Consequently, t he hig her

(lower ) the value of q (keeping in mind t hat 0 :::; q :::; k), the more (less) disclosure
t o which t he ent repreneur commits. In t he event t hat Y = Y is disclosed, market
makers do not charge a fee because t here is no informatio n asymmetry. In the event
99See, once again, Clinch a nd Verrecchia [1997].
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that Y

=Y

is withheld, however, a liquidity premium is charged.

The trade-off for the entrepreneur should be clear. In choosing a high q, he chooses
greater disclosure, makes m arkets more liquid, and thus red uces the information
asymm etry component of the cost of capital for a potential investor in the prim ary
market for equity offerings. But also in choosing a h ig h q, the entrepreneur increases
p roprieta ry costs by a llowing his competitor t o choose a more efficient production
schedule.

=

A s b efore, if the entrepreneur discloses Y

Y , b oth his firm and t he other firm

produce
X

D
e

=

X

D
o

= -31 (a + (JY) '

and the price at which the goods sell is
pD

= a + (JY -

Xe -

1

3(a + (JY) .

X0 =

If the entrepreneur does not d isclose Y = Y, t hen t he other firm does not know
this value. Consequently, because an undisclosed Y is uniformly distributed between

[-k, - q] a nd [q, k],

Y

(undisclosed) can only be interpreted based on its conditional

expectation (which is 0) . Therefore, here
XN
e

XN
0

1
3
1
-a
3 '

1
2

-a + - (JY a nd
'

and t he price at which the goods sell is

P

N

= a + (JY -

Xe -

X0

1

1

3

2

= -a + - (JY.

When the entrepreneur d iscloses, he earns revenue of
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when Y

= Y.

When t he entrepreneur does not disclose, he earns revenue of

w hen Y = Y. To d igress b riefly, note that this implies that independent of other
considerations, a strategy of n ever d isclosing always dominat es a strategy of always
disclosing, because

E [i~ fJN]

~ ( a 2 + ~j32k2)

~ ( a2 + ~i32k2)

>

E[i~ fJD].
The policy of disclosing w hen Y E [- q, q] and not disclosing w hen Y E [-k, - q] U[q, k]
yields expected revenue of

[~ (a + /3Y) 1Y E
2

E

[-q, qJ] x Pr (Y E [- q, q])

[~ (a+ ~J)Y) IY E [-k, - q] U [q, k]l
2

+E

2_
9k

x Pr (Y E [-k, - q] U [q, k])

(a2 k + 132 (~4 k3 _ .!j_q3))
.
12

Henceforth defineR (q) = 9~ ( a 2k

+ /32 (~k 3 -

5 3
12 q ) )

as the entrepreneur's expected

revenue a s a function of his disclosure choice q. Note that expect ed revenue function,

R (q), is decreasing in q. T his is what one would expect: in the presence of proprietary
costs expected revenue declines as the entrepreneur elects greater disclosure.
But another consequence of n ondisclosure is that the ma rket a lso does not know

Y=

Y when Y

E [- k , -q] U

[q, k ]. Consequently, in t he event of nondisclosure the

market values the entrepreneur's expected rev enue as

E [x~ PNIY E [- k, - q]

u [q, kJ]
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But informed traders know Y

= Y.

= Y

This implies that w henever Y

is n ot

disclosed, an informed trader w ho ex ecutes a trade in the second a ry market earns a
return based on t he difference between the market's expectation of the firm's revenue,

E[x~ p NIY

E [-k, -q] U [q, k]], and t he

actual revenue

of~ (a+ ~,6Y) .
2

That is, in

the event of nondisclosure, a n informed trader expects t o earn the following a m ount
as a function of the entrepreneur's disclosure choice q

1 q) J_k
r-q 119 (a + 23 ,6Y ) - 91(cl + 43 ,62l + 4q,62k
3
A (q) = 2 (k+ 43 ,62k2 ) IdY
1(a + -3 ,6Y ) 2 - -1(a 2 + -3 ,62q2 + -q,6
3 2k + -,6
3 2k 2) IdY.
+ 2 (k 1
- q) 1 1
9
2
9
4
4
4
2

k

q

This means that in the event of nondisclosure, market makers must charge each trader
(equivalently, each transaction) a liquidity premium of ~A (q) so as to break even in
a market populated by a 50%-50% mix of informed and uninformed traders.
N ow I return to the investor's problem. The investo r contributes capital of C and,
in return, she expects t o receive a percentage Q (q) of the entrepreneur's expected
revenue, which is R (q). In addition, with probability t the investor receives a liquidity
shock to purchase or sell more of the firm.

Note that in the event of a liquidity

shock, the invest or purchases or sells shares in the firm at the firm's expected value.
Consequently, the only effect of a liquidity shock on the investor's expected return
is that, in addit ion, she must pay the liquidity premium of ~A (q). Assume t hat
compet ition t o invest in the entrepreneur's firm is perfect; hence, investors can only
hope to break even when they invest C dollars of capital. Taken toget her, a ll ofthese
imply t hat the investor's expected payout for inv esting w ith the entrepreneur is

k - q 1
Q (q) R (q) - C- -k-t A (q),

2

where k ~qt represents the probability that t he investor receives a liquid ity shock
during a period in which the entrepreneur happens not to be disclosing. Therefore,
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t o "break even" in this arrangement, the investor must receive the percentage Q (q),
w here Q (q) is determined by

_ C + ~t>.(q) _
(
)
Q q R (q)
'
the entrepreneur receives the residual, 1 - Q (q). T he key feat ure of this analysis is
that p otential invest ors rationa lly anticipate all the benefits a nd costs of investing
before they purchase equity in the firm. 100
What disclosure policy choice minimizes the entrepreneur's cost of capital? The
entrepreneur's return from selling Q (q) percent of the firm t o the investor in exchange
for C d ollars of capital is

(1- Q (q)) R (q)

(1

_ C+ ~t>. (q)) ( )
R (q)
R q

R (q) - C-

k-q

~t).

(q ) ,

w here the first equality results from the fact t hat the investor only breaks even.
Consequently, the disclosure choice that minimizes the entrepreneur's cost of cap ital

k:;;.9t). (q ). It is a straightforward exercise to

is the one tha t m aximizes R (q) - C -

show that when the investor is immune from liquidity shocks (i.e., t = 0) , a p olicy
of nondisclosure maximizes R (q) - C-

k -;.9 t).
2

(q) (i .e., q = 0) . T his results from the

fact that R (q) is decreasing in q. Alternatively, consider w hat happens w hen t

=

0.5.

To facilitate the solution for the q that minimizes Q (q), assume that a= 0 .5, (3 = 1,

k

=

1, and C

=

0 .05 . To illustrate the calculation of). (q) for these parameter values,

define F (Y, q) and G (q) as

F (Y q)
'

1
Y
6

= -

2121
+ -1
Y - -q - -q 4

12

12

1
12'

l Oq'his is in contrast with Hudda rt, et al. [1999], for example. There, equity holders in a firm are
treated as exogenous, thereby giving them no opportunity to decide whether they want to invest in
the first place.
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G (q ) =

1

1 ,------

-3 + 3y (3q2 + 3q + 4),

r espectively. Together, t h ese imply that ).. (q) is defined as

).. (q ) = -

1
(
)
2 k - q

(1-q F (Y, q) dY + 1G(q)F (Y, q) dY- 11
-1

G(q)

q

F (Y, q) dY

)

for a ll q E [0, 0.5], w hereas

).. (q)

=-

1
)
2 k - q
(

(1-q F (Y, q) dY- }q{ F (Y, q) dY)
1

-1

for all q E [0.5, 1]. Using this expression for ).. (q), one can show that R (q) - C k;qt ).. (q) is maximized at

q = 0. 37979. In other words, the entrepreneur's return is

maximized w hen the marginal benefit of disclosure equals the marginal cost (through
propriet ary cost s) ; this occurs a t q

=

0. 37979 .101

In addition, at t h is value the

invest or receives Q (0. 37979) = 62% of the revenue gener ating activ ities of the firm,
w hile t he ent repreneur reta ins 38%. This implies that t h e entrepreneur's cost of
capit al is Q (0 . 37979) x R (0. 37979) = 0.068; it compares with a cost of C = 0.05 in
the absence of an adverse selection problem (w hich occurs when)..= 0) . Consequently,
in this exa mple the information asymmet ry component of the cost of capital is the
difference, which is 0.018 .
To summa rize this example, its purpose is to illustrate the concept of the information asy mmetry component of the cost of capit al. The cost of ca p ital is the
percentage of the firm an entr epreneur m ust sell t o raise a fixed amount of capita l.
The information asymmetry component of the cost of capita l is the d ifference in the
101 determined the value of q tha t maximizes R (q) - C - ~t). (q) by plotting this function using
the para meters values a= 0.5, f3 = 1, 1 = 1, k = 1, C = 0 .05 a nd t = 0.5, observing that it is
concave over the ra n ge q E [0, 1] for t h ese values, a nd t hen n oting t hat the only value fo r w hich
ddq (

R (q) - C - ~t). (q)) = 0 over q E [0, 1] is q = 0.37979. A more = mplet e pro of requires

show ing that the function R (q) - C - ~t). (q) is concave over q E [0, k] for some general class
of pa rameter values , and then determining the q tha t maximizes the function for t hose pa rameter
values .
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cost of capital in t he presence versus a bsence of an adverse selection p roblem t h at
arises from informat ion asymmetry. In effect , it results as a consequence of the entrepreneur's inabilit y t o commit to a policy of full disclosure because of the presence of
other, d isclosure-related costs (e.g ., proprietary cost s) . An ancillary purpose of the
vignette is t o show how liquidity premia in combination wit h p roprietary costs may
lead to efficient disclosu re choices in which the firm neither fully discloses, nor tot ally
w ithholds, information. Specifically, in the example a bove the entrepreneur commits
t o som e disclosure so as t o mitigate pro blems arising from illiquid markets . He does
not , however, commit to full disclosure becaus e the proprietary costs that aris e from
this action are too high. Nor, for t hat matter, does he suppress all disclosure, a s this
would drive up his cost of capital precipitously.
Before concluding, let me discuss t he role of one last maintained assumption.
This vignette, and indeed my ent ire discussion throughout this essay, presumes t h at
a commitment to more disclosure lea ds to less information asymmetry, and this presumption is not without controversy. Fo r example, recall m odel #6 in the first essay.
In that m odel disclosure was represented by

y = u + ~;

in addit ion it was assumed

that investors also possessed private information about ~' in the form of Oi = ~ -

wi,

w here the w;'s have a normal dist ribution with mean 0 and precisions W ;. Here, greater
disclosure exacerbates (as opposed t o ameliorat es) inform atio n asymmetry among investors.102 Thought of som ewhat loosely, t his characterizat ion treats disclosure and
private information gat hering, and hence information asymmetry, as complements,
not substitutes. While models tha t posit a posit ive relation between disclosure and
informatio n asymmetry are no m ore o r less valid t han those that p osit a negative relatio n , the former typically speak t o a type of transitory behavior that may arise around
l Ogee, for example, Kim a nd Verrecchia [1994] and Bushman, et al. [1997].
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the brief w indow of an anticipated disclosure (e.g., an earnings announcement) , and
not to commitments t o greater disclosure over longer w indow s. Alternat ively, the
discussion in this essay speaks specifically to commitments t o greater disclosure over
longer windows. In short, the discussion here maintains as an assumption the notion
that a commitment t o greater disclosure degrades the private benefits of information
gathering, and hence reduces information asymmetry.

Summary. While this essay reviews a variety of work that has attempt ed t o link
efficiency to disclosure, either in the context of social welfare or single-firm efficiency,
in m y opinion the one with the greatest potential is the link betw een disclosure and
the info rmation asymmetry reductio n. To date there is very little research on this
t opic, either theory- o r empirical-based. One explanat ion fo r the paucity of research
is that establishing a link is difficult, esp ecially in empirical studies.103 Even in the
"simple" modeling vignette offered above (wit h all its stylized assumptions) , the link
is fa r from transparent . Of course, an a lternative explanation is that research ers a re
simply not aware of the issue. To the extent to which this is the case, p erhaps this
document will serve as a ra llying cry for m ore work on this topic. But in view of
the fact that the discussion has turned to the t opic of directions for future research,
perhaps it is appropriate to ma ke our way to the final section of this paper.

5

Directions for Future Research

What research activity do I hope this document will encourage in t he future? Hav ing
allu ded t o the absence of a comprehensive t heory in the introduction, t his would
certainly be a worthw hile outcome. To be truly comprehensive, however, a theory
l OSome empirical-based wor k that has attempted to link disclosure and cost of capital includes
Welker [1995], Botosan [1997], Healy, et al. [1999], and Leuz and Verrecchia [2000].
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must embrace efficiency, incentives, a nd the endogeneit y of the market process as it
involves interactions among diverse invest or agents. For exam ple, I view research that
ex amines incentives t o disclose in markets comprised of a s ingle, representative trader
(e.g. , discretio nary-based disclosure studies ) as no more or less "comprehensive" than
those that endogenize t he market and treat disclosure a s exogenous (e.g., associationbased disclosure) . Both approaches only look at one piece of the overall disclosure
puzzle.
M y suggestion for linking disclosure to efficiency, incentives, and the endogeneity
of the market process is through the reduction in t he information asymmetry component of the cost of capital. Information asymmetry inhibits investment, thereby
making it m ore costly for a firm to engage in those a ctivities for which it has b een
incorpora ted. As d iscussed in the previous essay, a commitment t o greater disclosure
reduces information asymmetry ; this, in turn, lowers that component of a firm's cost
of capital t hat arises from information a sy mmetry. In short, information asymmetry
reduction provides a rationale for efficient disclosure choice. In this sense it may be
the nat ural progeny of early efficiency work in accounting that att empted to find
sufficient conditions fo r disclosure . W hether or not one accepts the latter, t he notion
of increasing m a rket liquidity through information asymmetry reduction seems prima

facie consistent wit h the language regulat ors often use when they describe t he role of
accountin g standards as one of "leveling the playing field" and increasing "investor
confidence." 104 As Arthur Levitt st ates:
"high quality accounting st andards result in great er inv estor confidence,
which improves liquidity, reduces capital costs, and makes market prices
possible." 105
l D$ee
105

Sut ton [1997].
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I interpret this statement a s speaking to the notio n that a commitment t o higher quality disclosure is efficient in that it leads to a reduction in the information asymmetry
component of the cost of ca pital.
I hasten to add, however , that none of my discussion is intended to suggest t hat
no other vehicles exist to integrate the theory of disclosure comprehensiv ely. May
the proverbial "thousand flowers bloom": if there exist mo re successful approaches
fo r linking disclosure t o efficiency, I will not be displeased. If this document inspires
such a treatise, I will have some claim to paternity.
But another pot ent ial research activ ity that I ho pe will result from this document
is empirical work that forges a link between disclosure and its economic consequences.
While I am interest ed in all such links, let me suggest again that the one w ith the
greatest potential may be t he link between disclosure and information asymmetry
reduction. While it may strike a read er as unusual for the author of paper on theory based models t o be promulgating t he idea of more empirical research on t he economic
consequences of disclosure, I would like t o see more empirical resources committed
t o many of the issues discussed here. Theory-based work has a ttributed many associations, incentives, and efficiencies to disclosure. While there is extensive empirical
work on associat ions and incentives, efficiency, as I define that term in the context
of section 4, is less well studied. It would be of some interest to know the nature
and type of efficiencies that exist in real institutio nal settings, and, if they d o exist, whether they have any eco nomic significance. In other words, as t he theory of
disclosure matures it seems reasonable to inquire whether t he empirical literature
can provide additional insights into t he economic consequences of disclosure. These
insig hts could be especially valuable if they were premised on the variety of issues
See Levitt [1998, p. 81].
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discussed in these essays.
For example, for all my enthusiasm for the information asymmetry compo nent of
the cost of capital as a start ing point for a comprehensive theo ry, I acknowledge the
difficulty of ferreting it out in real market settings. Info rmation asymmetry, like many
of the economic co nsequences p osited in t hese essays, is a "second-moment" effect
(i.e., a var iance effect), and second-moment effects may be very secondary or tertiary
in nature w hen compared against "first -moment" effects (i.e ., mean effects ). For ex ample, one would expect to be able to document that, as a first-moment effect, "good
news" drives prices up a nd "bad news" drives prices down. T heory -based models ,
however, commonly characterize information asymmetry a s a second-moment effect
that is unrelat ed to mea ns, or first moments . Info rmation asymmet ry is commonly
characterized this way because variables are p osited to have a normal distribution,
w hich implies t wo indep endent moments; obviously, for other (i.e ., non-normal) distributional forms, t h ere may be higher moments and all moments may b e related.
The problem wit h second -moment effects is that they may be too subtle or obscure
to manifest themselves in measurable ways. This is especially true when one uses
data from firms publicly registered in the US b ecause under current US Generally
Accepted Accounting Principles (US-GAAP), the disclosure environment is already
r ich. In other words, commitments to increased (or reduced) levels of dis closure in
the US may be primarily increm enta l, thereby leading to economic consequences that
are difficult to document. One alternat ive is to suggest that researchers consider less
developed capita l markets t h an those found in the US.
To conclude, one issue that deserves g reater attention in t he accounting literat ure,
both theory-based and empirical, is t he relation b etween disclosure and infor matio n
asymmetry reduction. Among other t hings , this relation links disclosure t o efficiency,
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and in t his sense prov ides an economic rat ionale for the utility of fina ncial rep ort ing .
But while t he existing theory on t his topic is compelling, demonstrating the link
empirically has proved elus ive. This may mean t hat w e need b ett er t heories; it may
also m ean that we need better empirical m ethodologies. It is probably t he case that
we need a little m ore of bot h.
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